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ABSTRACT
An unintended consequence of the industrialization of the United States
has been the creation of an estimated 450,000 brownfields, or environmentally
impaired properties. The U.S. Congress passed the Superfund Act of 1980 to
attempt to clean up contaminated sites with money from the original polluters, but
with limited success. Now the regulatory climate is changing to favor working with
investors interested in buying and redeveloping these troubled properties.
The investment opportunity is not of the same magnitude as that of
distressed assets left over from the Savings and Loan crisis. Brownfields are
much harder for a buyer to locate, and not as many are choice assets-many
even have a negative value. Yet similarities exist between both opportunities, in
the degree of knowledge that will be necessary to handle the complex deals. For
brownfields, an understanding is needed especially of remediation techniques
and environmental law.
Whether capital flows into brownfields depends heavily on several factors.
On all levels, government must be cooperative, as it balances competing goals.
As custodians of the public good, elected officials surely will not allow
unsupervised, cursory remediations at the cost of leaving potentially harmful
contamination at sites. But, within a structure of suitable oversight, government
can relax rigid environmental standards, offer regulatory flexibility, provide a
dependable regulatory timeline for processing forms, and supply financial
enticements such as tax incentives, loans, and grants. Also, the unacceptable
threat of unbounded risk associated with cleanup costs and legal liabilities must
be addressed through insurance policies.
The eventual sources of capital may be public, as with a
Commercial Mortgage Backed Security or a Real Estate Investment Trust, or
private, as with an opportunity fund or a wealthy entrepreneur. Financial experts
who were interviewed analyzed advantages and disadvantages of the different
capital vehicles. They suggested that partnerships might develop between real
estate companies and remediation firms. Overall, there was a consensus that at
the moment, capital is poised to flow into environmentally impaired properties,
and is simply waiting for the right set of conditions to do so.
Thesis Supervisor: Lawrence S. Bacow
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In the United States, one unfortunate byproduct of the shift from a
manufacturing to a service-based economy is the creation of hundreds of
thousands of brownfields. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines
brownfields as "abandoned, idled, or underused industrial or commercial facilities
where expansion or redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived
environmental contamination."' The U.S. General Accounting Office has placed
the cleanup of these estimated 425,000 sites as high as $650 billion". Although
the government could assume this responsibility, the cost would probably be
unacceptable to taxpayers. A more cost-effective solution is to find a way to
stimulate the flow of private capital into acquiring and cleaning up
environmentally impaired properties.
This issue concerns every major American city and even some rural
areas. The EPA estimates that 70 million Americans-including more than 10
million children-live within four miles of a toxic waste site."' Most urban areas
have sites where industrial activity once thrived that are now fallow or that have
been converted to non-manufacturing uses. Many are polluted to some degree.
Many have fallen into the hands of city governments through tax lien
foreclosures, and thus do not generate any property-tax revenue. One study
estimates tax losses from idle sites, in 33 cities surveyed, to be as much as $386
million a year"'. Ideally, the present owners and prospective buyers need to be
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encouraged to undertake the expensive cleanups. Ironically, however, federal
environmental legislation discourages involvement with these problem properties.
In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). More popularly known as
Superfund, the legislation provided a means for the cleanup of hazardous
substances previously released into the environment. The law included
far-reaching rules for assigning liability that led, not surprisingly, to protracted
court battles. From 1980 to 1991, more than one-third of the $11.3 billion spent
by the private sector on federal Superfund sites went toward litigation costs
rather than actual cleanup.v
Retroactive liability under Superfund means that the long arm of liability
can potentially even reach back decades, and minor contributors to pollution at a
site can end up shouldering a disproportionate burden of the cleanup costs.
Federal Judge Douglas Woodlock stated, "The only fair thing about CERCLA is
that it treats everyone unfairly."*' Both those who generated and transported
hazardous substances, along with property owners, are "jointly and severally
liable." This liability allows the EPA to sue any responsible parties individually, or
all of them together. A new property owner, simply by virtue of owning the title to
the property, can find himself also drawn into the entangling net of liability.
Because of this risk, investors have been reluctant to acquire contaminated sites
even when such sites are capable of being fully remediated and redeveloped.
The threat of liability has sent a chill through ranks of both potential
investors in the sites and the financial institutions that might have bankrolled
them. Strong, healthy lending institutions fear inheriting responsibility for a
property after foreclosure. Lenders normally assume when underwriting loans
that the maximum that they can lose is the amount of the loan, but under
Superfund legislation, they could lose much more. In September of 1996 this
problem was addressed with the Asset Conservation Act. This law shielded
lenders from liability for pollution cleanup by not holding them liable if, after the
foreclosure, they attempted to sell the property and were not exacerbating the
existing problem. But the force of law could not resolve another obvious
problem: even if banks did not face unlimited expenses for "remediation," or
cleanup, their loan collateral might still be devalued by the presence of pollution
on a site.
Banks and investors have been sufficiently risk averse that they have also
avoided sites that have been "officially" remediated. These properties, although
considered clean under guidelines in government statutes, have a higher
probability of needing future cash infusions to remedy contamination-related
problems than virgin greenfields. This money could be needed to remediate
pollution that reappears, or to meet, at some point in the future, more stringent
government-mandated environmental standards. Those few investors who have
been willing to invest in brownfields have compensated for the additional risk by
demanding a higher return, which in turn reduces the value of the property.
Investors found it difficult to find banks to underwrite these properties because of
the stigma of previous contamination and the related set of additional risks.
Still, despite the checkered history of Superfund, private capital under the
right circumstances is likely to flow into brownfields. In fact, capital is already
being raised in anticipation of the ability to better manage post-cleanup risks. As
will be discussed in a later chapter, private investors have tentatively earmarked
over $1 billion for brownfield investment. Properties have been scouted, and a
few purchased, though it is unknown if any remediation processes have been
completed. Right now, whether private capital continues to flow into brownfields
depends heavily on whether the risks associated with these impaired properties
are well defined and understood.
To better understand the risks, the EPA has created a pilot program to
identify brownfields, and at specific sites, the boundaries of contamination and
the strategies for promoting cleanup through redevelopment. The program
provides for community grants up to $200,000 apiece. Brownfields, like most
environmental issues, fall within the EPA's jurisdiction. EPA even coined the
term in 1993 when it created the "Brownfields Economic Redevelopment
Initiative." This initiative shifted the agency's strategy from a policeman's role of
enforcing strict liability to a facilitator's approach of encouraging more voluntary
cleanups.
To date, the EPA has been principally concerned with sites judged most in
need of cleanup. These sites are placed on the National Priorities List (NPL) and
ranked. The NPL currently consists of 1,387 toxic waste sites, 410 of which were
shown as completely cleaned up by the end of fiscal year '96.v" A separate
database, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Information System (CERCLIS), contains basic information about
locations undergoing Superfund remediation, as well as an inventory of those
that are potentially contaminated. CERCLIS lists 40,000 sites, but over 27,000 of
these had been removed by September of 1996 because they required no action
under the federal Superfund program."" Thousands of these sites were not
contaminated, while state cleanup programs will address others through their
brownfields programs.
In the end, brownfields represent an opportunity for investors and lending
institutions. Money will flow toward these properties when, compared to
competing investment options, brownfields bring a higher return but with a similar
level of risk. Pitfalls exist. Historically, risks related to site contamination have
been perceived as unlimited and difficult to underwrite. Since investors have the
freedom to invest their money elsewhere they have avoided contaminated
properties. Investors may continue not to invest in the future if the risks are not
clearly defined and costs well quantified.
This thesis attempts to identify the conditions under which capital will flow
to environmentally impaired properties. In the next chapter, current government
attempts to stimulate investment are reviewed. The third chapter examines what
can be learned by looking at a related case history: How did companies invest in
the troubled assets that became available after the Savings and Loan crisis?
The fourth chapter, drawing upon a series of interviews with experts who
understand environmentally impaired properties and financing, addresses the
matter of how to create a favorable conduit for investment. It also considers what
capital has become available, who is best suited to take on this degree of
development risk, and why certain companies have so far declined to do so. The
fifth chapter will look at the role insurers play in underwriting certain risks, and
how development of environmental insurance may facilitate a better flow of
capital. For the conclusion, a hypothetical example of an ideal brownfield
transaction is constructed and analyzed, and prospects for the future movement
of capital are discussed.
' U.S. EPA, "Tool Kit of Technology Information Resources for Brownfield
Sites," DRAFT Version, November 1996, p. 1.
Environmental Business Journal, "First Generation of Brownfields Deals Underway," February 1997, p. 1.
M2 Communications Limited, "U.S. EPA: Administrator Cites 4 0 0th
Superfund Cleanup," October 16, 1996.
'v. Voorhees, John "Brownfields-Put Green in Pockets," American City Business Journals, 9/13/96, Survey by the
United States Conference of Mayors.
v. Silber, Kenneth, "When Cleanliness Isn't a Virtue," City Journal, @ 1996,
Bank of America.
Vi. Milkey, James R. Esq., Chief of Environmental Protection Division, Office
of Attorney General Scott Harshbarger, Speech in Waltham, Mass, May 14,
1997.
V". M2 Communications Limited, October 16, 1996
""' McCabe, Michael, Regional Administrator, EPA Region Ill., Congressional testimony in Bristol, Pennsylvania
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CHAPTER 2
GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS TO STIMULATE CAPITAL FLOW
By its policies and actions, the government can have a marked effect on
the willingness of private capital to invest in environmentally impaired properties.
In the past, regulations such as those associated with Superfund legislation have
frightened investors away from properties with contamination, no matter how
slight. But the government need not have only a negative impact; it can
encourage investment, through a variety of policies. For example relaxing rigid
environmental standards might remove part of the threat of liability, though at the
cost of future risk to the environment. For public officials, the difficulty then lies in
striking a proper balance between finding an acceptable degree of "cleanup," and
ensuring the health and safety of its citizens, and the environment. This chapter
will look at policies-some under consideration, and others that actually have
been tried by governments on the federal, state, and local levels-that in some
way influence the flow of capital to environmentally impaired sites.
In an open, free-market system, investors have no shortage of competing
alternatives for their money. The array of investment possibilities is dizzying:
everything from stocks and bonds that are liquid securities to illiquid investments
in startup companies and real estate. While investors may have different
preferences, they all share a similar desire to enhance their risk-adjusted returns.
Regardless of preference, all investors will view each of the following as
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desirable, all other things being equal:
1. Reduce the initial cost of the investment.
2. Increase the subsequent return.
3. Reduce the risk or volatility.
Quite simply, a policy that either reduces the initial cost of an investment,
increases the subsequent return, or reduces volatility of the return, unequivocally
makes the investment more attractive.
Any policy designed to increase the flow of capital to brownfields must
somehow address at least one of these factors. For example, government-
sponsored remediation grants can reduce initial cost. Further, loans and credit
enhancements serve the same end by making loans for investors more
affordable. State and local governments can offer tax incentives to enhance
future returns. Finally, reducing risk can be achieved in part by restructuring
certain laws, such as the state superfund statutes. These laws could be changed
with a simple legislative vote so that, perhaps, the future owners of a
contaminated property do not bear the same legal burden as the original
polluters. Modifying and clarifying existing legislation not only would help to draw
investment, but also would be the least expensive method for doing so because it
would not require any capital expenditures by the government.
So far, governments have taken a variety of approaches to clean up and
rehabilitate their undesirable brownfields. Through Superfund, the federal
government used the "stick" of enforcement during the 1980s to push potentially
responsible parties into undertaking remediation. During the late 1980s, the
states were the first to switch to a more cooperative posture, trying to encourage
voluntary cleanups while holding onto the threat of imposing costly enforcement
actions. Meanwhile, on the local level, communities often suffered helplessly.
Representative Peter Larkin once remarked that Pittsfield, Mass lost a $50
million plant that could have employed two thousand workers in part because
legislation did not exist to clean up a former GE site there.'
To understand public policy with regard to brownfields, it is necessary to
examine the roles of different levels of government. Generally speaking, the
federal government shifts the burden of dealing with brownfields onto the states,
while retaining a final veto over state policies in the form of CERCLA. Federal
officials justify this arrangement by arguing that, if left unchecked, state and local
officials may choose economic growth over the long-term health and safety of the
nation's citizens. Exactly how each level of government can influence the flow of
capital is explored below.
Federal
The EPA was formed through the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 to oversee most federal antipollution activity. The agency is charged with
protecting human health and the environment. The Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 was one of the first significant laws to address the
problem of contamination. This statute gave EPA the authority to regulate
comprehensively the estimated 303 million tons of hazardous waste generated
annually." EPA required that hazardous waste be tracked from its initial
production right through to its ultimate disposal.
Then in 1980, in response to the discovery of toxic chemicals below the
neighborhood of Love Canal in Niagara Falls, New York"', Congress enacted
CERCLA, a sweeping, tough-minded piece of environmental legislation.
Otherwise known as Superfund, CERCLA continues to be the most influential
and_comprehensive federal law related to the release of hazardous materials in
the environment, especially at inactive waste sites. However, significant as it
was, CERCLA neglected to address a host of issues concerning real estate, and
the reuse of formerly contaminated property.
In 1986 CERCLA was revised. Changes included clauses that specified
that liens would be put on property cleaned up with public funds, so as to prevent
private owners from profiting unfairly. The new version of CERCLA allowed
federal regulators access to sites believed to be contaminated. Additionally,
Prospective Purchaser Agreements (PPAs) were created. Under a PPA, the EPA
promises not to pursue the new owner for cleanup costs if certain conditions are
met. From 1989 to 1996, of the 25 PPAs entered into, 23 were for severely
contaminated locations. Accordingly, the PPA provision was recently updated.
Now the EPA will accept less than a complete cleanup if a prospective buyer
demonstrates direct economic benefits to the community as a result of
purchasing and redeveloping the land, thereby reducing the initial investment
CoSt.1"
But PPAs became available only after many years of Superfund policy that
drove investors away from sites suffering some degree of pollution. The fear of
Superfund caused investors to avoid even lightly contaminated sites. One
problem was the law's broadbrush approach that mandated that, during the
1980s, locations had to be cleaned to the same strict standard, whether they
were to be reused later for a day care center or a manufacturing plant.
In the early 1990s it became obvious that the adversarial and
prosecutorial approach was not appropriate for cleaning up the nation's
brownfields. A major shift in thinking occurred among virtually all public officials
specializing in environmental policy. By 1994, a consensus existed that any
reauthorization of CERCLA had to include policies designed to link cleanup and
reuse." In 1995 the EPA took a further step by creating the Brownfields Action
Agenda, which was an outline of the EPA's plans to help states and localities put
into force a previously formulated paper known as the Brownfields Initiative.
Within the outline appears a description of the agenda as a "work in process" that
attempts to:
"Help reverse the spiral of unaddressed contamination, declining
property values, and increased unemployment often found in inner city
industrial areas, while maintaining deterrents to future contamination and
EPA's focus on assessing and cleaning up "worst sites first."""'
The Action Agenda looked at the problem of barriers created by
regulations, guidance and administrative practices. It recommended swift,
aggressive measures for change, all within the context of the existing Superfund
law. EPA is currently working with States and localities to develop guidelines to
clarify the tangle of liability of owners, purchasers and lenders at a hazardous
waste site. The guidelines clearly state EPA's decision to use enforcement
discretion, in certain situations, not to pursue parties. An example is the policy
statement to an owner whose clean property contains groundwater that has been
contaminated by a neighboring parcel. In such a situation, EPA notifies the owner
that it does not "anticipate" suing him to remedy groundwater contamination on
his property if he did not cause or contribute to it. This reduces the risk to
investors, but as is typical with many EPA clarifications, the reassurance stops
short of eliminating all risk by using ambiguous language such as "anticipate."
Still, EPA has limited powers to grant leeway; only Congress has the
ability to change the Superfund law itself. At the moment there is disagreement
as to how CERCLA should be changed, but members of Congress do agree it
needs to be amended. Several times during this decade amendments to
CERCLA have been proposed, with the most recent revision to pass being the
Asset Conservation Act. This act reduces risk for lending institutions to a point
that encourages them to make loans, with lower interest rates, which in turn
increases subsequent returns for investors. Other possible CERCLA changes
have been suggested to improve the environment for investing in brownfields:
1. Free a prospective purchaser who is not at fault for preexisting
contamination from potential liability
2. Create community work groups at CERCLA sites that would agree to
an appropriate future use; this reduces the probability of investing time in
projects that the local community rises up to oppose, and halt.
3. Let states, without interference from the federal government, handle
sites where there is no compelling federal interest
EPA has not waited, however, for Congress to improve Superfund
legislation. It has taken the lead on rehabilitating contaminated properties with its
Brownfields Pilot Program. Information from the pilots will be compiled in a
database so that the EPA and states can learn and tailor their programs based
on lessons learned in municipalities across the nation. The information supplies
the EPA, states, and localities with useful facts and cutting-edge strategies for
bringing a brownfield back into acceptable use. The database covers everything
from environmental assessment to cleanup and redevelopment. This represents
a departure for the EPA, which in the past has given little consideration to the
issue of reuse.
As of May 1997, 113 pilot programs totaling nearly $20 million had been
launched. Municipalities across the country have used this money to do
everything from compiling lists of contaminated sites in their communities, to
doing site assessments so that prospective buyers will have information so that
they can make offers on the properties. The initial 29 recipients who received
assessment funds before 1996 are now eligible for cleanup grants of up to
$350,000 to capitalize revolving loan funds.v" The very first pilot program,
awarded to Cuyahoga County (Cleveland), Ohio in November 1993, managed to
leverage $3.2 million for environmental cleanup and property improvements and
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created more than 170 new jobs.v"" The EPA makes what may be an ambitious
estimate by predicting that by the year 2000 the Brownfields Pilot Program will
result in cleanups at some five thousand sites in three hundred cities-"
Besides the pilot program, there are a few cases of CERCLA funding
being used in the brownfield process, basically to make assessments. The state
of Delaware requested, and received, money to conduct an assessment of 70
older industrial properties along the Wilmington waterfront. This is very much in
the spirit of current federal programs, which for the most part do not benefit
investors directly, but rather concentrate on gathering detailed information about
particular contaminated sites and technologies for remediation. All this is then
made available, free of cost, to the public. This indirectly benefits investors by
reducing the risk of setbacks from previously unforeseen obstacles.
The EPA is accelerating movement along the learning curve for wary
investors as well by acting as an information clearinghouse. Consider its
Technology Innovation Office, which directs interested parties to innovative and
cost-effective technologies to characterize, and then to remediate, polluted sites.
For investors, identifying faster and cheaper cleanup options can suddenly make
viable a once marginal property. In January of 1996, the EPA even placed a
Brownfields homepage on the Internet, to disseminate all the agency's latest
information, right down to contact names for local EPA administrators.
As an added incentive, the federal government has stated, as a policy
objective, a willingness to work with private interests, and even to assist them
financially. On May 13 of 1997, Vice-President Al Gore announced the
Brownfields National Partnership Action Agenda. It would build relationships
between public and private organizations to link environmental protection with
economic development and community revitalization. This agenda features one
hundred commitments from more than 25 organizations, including more than 15
Federal agencies. The commitments will add up to a $300 million federal
investment in communities with brownfields, supported by an additional $165
million in loan guarantees. The Interagency Working Group that developed the
agenda issued this sanguine forecast:
"The resulting action will help cleanup and redevelopment at up to
5,000 properties, leveraging from $5 billion up to $28 billion in private
investment, supporting 196,000 jobs, protecting up to 34,000 acres of
"greenfields" and improving the quality of life for as many as 18 million
Americans living near brownfields."Px
The Partnership Action Agenda manages to satisfy all three of an
investor's objectives to enhance returns. Site assessments and remediation
grants will reduce the initial cost of investments; making capital available at
market rates will increase subsequent returns. Government's declared
willingness to work closely with private interests will reduce the risk and volatility
that investors have labored under with ill-defined policies in an uncertain
regulatory climate.
A number of federal agencies now have sections of their budgets
earmarked for brownfields. The Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) will set aside $155 million in community development grants and an
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additional $165 million in loan guarantees. This money will be devoted to
financing the rehabilitation of privately owned brownfield sites. Other federal
funds can be targeted for cleanups in Empowerment Zones and Enterprise
Communities. The Department of Transportation has committed another $4.2
million for "sustainable transportation," or transportation-related improvements for
eligible sites: anything from installing a bus stop to constructing an access road.
These programs provide both reduced initial costs, and enhanced returns for
investors, by subsidizing the initial cost of redevelopment and providing financing
at below market rates.
State
State policies substantially guide decisions at brownfield sites because the
cleanup generally follows state environmental laws. With the exception of
Superfund sites, the EPA expects states and localities to be responsible for
overseeing the tasks of assessing, cleaning up and redeveloping contaminated
properties. Currently 37 states have programs in place to encourage voluntary
cleanups. Typically, first a purchaser agreement is struck, which requires a
certain state-reviewed level of cleanup. Once this level has been reached, the
state will then grant certain freedoms from liability to the new owner, thereby
reducing their future risk.
The specter of federal intervention is still present, though. Fear of later
EPA involvement can complicate redevelopment, especially when an owner is
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trying to secure financial backing. The EPA has responded with a public
statement that it will not interfere at sites participating in state-sponsored
voluntary cleanup programs. Some regional EPA offices have gone so far as to
reassure states by putting their commitment in writing with so-called "comfort
language." This is done through letters stating such things as a site has no
previous or current Superfund interest.x' What remains is for the EPA to institute
a formal program to certify the quality of state voluntary cleanup programs, which
will act to reduce volatility. This, at last, would validate these informal programs,
and make the financing of brownfield projects more attractive.""
State policy makers, after all, have perhaps an even greater influence than
their federal counterparts on the flow of private capital into environmentally
impaired properties. The following is a list of the most common means by which
they stimulate remediation and redevelopment:
1. Simplified or lower cleanup standards
2. Liability relief
3. Financial incentives
4. Sureness of process (i.e., guarantee of a predictable,
reasonably certain regulatory process)
The rest of this section will examine these four factors, one by one,
beginning with the problem of cleanup standards-the most contentious technical
issue associated with remediation. After the enactment of CERCLA on the
federal level, states passed their own individual "superfund" legislation. The
packages varied greatly in their particulars, as each state had different problems
to cope with.
In general, states defaulted to the EPA's basic toxicology findings. But the
data often created confusing debates, as only a few people really understood the
science behind the numbers. States set protection levels that ranged from 10-6
(one death in a million) to 104 (one death in ten thousand) for carcinogens such
as dioxins and PCBs. x"' Arguably, a lower cleanup standard is appropriate for
industrial or commercial use than for residential. Some states consider the future
land use in passing judgment on what constitutes "clean" soil. This replaces the
traditional, "one size fits all" approach in which industrial properties had to meet
the same strict requirements as residential neighborhoods-such that children
could safely eat remediated earth. For prospective investors, the flexibility of risk-
based cleanup levels can be as important an incentive for redevelopment as
securing adequate financial assistance because it can greatly reduce the initial
investment required.x'v
Also critical is finding a way to shield investors from a seemingly endless
chain of liability. For one, there is third party liability, or being sued for damages
for anything from personal injury to loss of property value. Owners of
contaminated property also face as well the possibility of future state-filed
lawsuits to deal with such matters as recurring or additional pollution, a tightening
of cleanup standards, or a change of land use. But, after an owner has reached
the agreed upon cleanup level, states offering liability relief will issue a covenant
not-to-sue or a "comfort" letter, an action that reduces future risk. Federally
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enacted liability relief, such as the Asset Conservation Act, usually applies only if
the state enacts similar legislation.
Just as investors cannot tolerate the prospect of uncertain and unlimited
liability, they must also have sureness of process. As one developer put it, "I
don't care whether I am told by the state regulatory agency that the process will
take two or four years; what does matter is that once they tell me two that it does
not take four."1" Overlapping jurisdictional issues-do federal or state rules take
precedence in a given situation?-can complicate the process of regulatory
approval. Thus, simplifying the veritable labyrinth of regulations and paperwork
associated with brownfields is one step toward reducing risks. To demonstrate its
good faith toward this end, Pennsylvania refunds application fees when a
brownfield-related permit is not acted upon within the published timeframe. In
Massachusetts and Ohio the state allows private consultants, Licensed Site
Professionals, who are licensed by the state to handle brownfield inspections and
paperwork. These two states are then better able to deal with the sheer number
of sites with a smaller in-house staff, and with more efficiency, resulting in less
chance of an applicant encountering a regulatory bottleneck, and reducing the
volatility of the process.
With regard to financial assistance, most states do not offer any form of
help for site assessment or remediation. Those that do, offer a broad assortment
of programs (Appendix 1 - Matrix of State Voluntary Cleanup and Brownfield
Programs) that combine grants, loans, and tax credits. Five states offer grants or
loans, six provide tax incentives, and some states offer both. Currently, most of
the grants and loans are available only to local governments for properties
acquired through foreclosed tax liens. Yet Pennsylvania and Minnesota reach out
to the private sector with grants for remediation that require a 25 to 50 percent
matching sum from owners, and Ohio has a low-interest loan program.
Tax incentives differ from state to state, though they are usually available
only to parties not responsible for the original pollution. Michigan and Ohio give
tax credits up to 10 percent of "eligible" remediation costs. Delaware ties its tax
credits to the creation of new employment: a $500 a year deduction can be taken
each year for each new job that arises from redevelopment, up until the cost of
the cleanup has been recouped. Tax incentives are an important way to
increase investors subsequent returns.
Each state has tailored its package of brownfield financial incentives to its
own environmental goals and political circumstances. A state like Massachusetts
is constrained by the state constitution, which forbids using state money to
benefit a private party. It would be unconstitutional, for example, for
Massachusetts to develop an incentive wherein it assumed default risk, because
investors then would enjoy higher subsequent returns.
All of these initiatives aimed at enticing investors to brownfields, from
matching grants to flexible cleanup standards, have been introduced only within
the last couple of years. It is still too early to judge which are most successful at
leveraging private capital, but there is strong evidence through the pilot program
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that these initiatives have been responsible for spurring redevelopment projects
that would not have occurred otherwise.
Local
Time and again, case studies performed by the Northeast-Midwest
Institute' found that a critical element in cleaning up brownfields was the
presence of a strong, committed local government. Local initiatives follow the
realization that individual communities, not abstract entities like federal and state
governments, suffer the most from having polluted properties in their midst. One
study estimated that, immediately following the addition of a toxic waste site to
the Superfund list, property values within a 6.2 mile radius decreased by as much
as $3,310 for each mile closer to the site they happened to be.x"(
Municipalities often provide financing to make a brownfield project
economically viable. Several common types of incentives are tax abatements,
general obligation (G.O.) bonds, and Tax-Increment Financing2 (TIF). Four
states offer tax abatements. Idaho, Ohio and Maryland grant a 50 percent tax
1 The Northeast-Midwest Institute is a non-profit public education organization that conducted
research using a case study approach with funding from the EPA.
2Tax-Increment Financing is used to raise public-sector capital for a project. TIFs are built on the
concept that new value will be created and this value can be used to finance part of the activities
needed now to create the new value. The tax revenue generated by the project is earmarked to
redeem the bonds that were issued to raise the capital needed for redevelopment. TIFs do not
lower the amount of tax revenues collected, nor do they impose special assessments on the
project area. Northeast-Midwest Institute, Coming Clean
abatement on any added value to the property that results from remediation. New
Jersey's abatement plan begins with a 100-percent forgiveness of property taxes
that, over the course of ten years, decreases to zero unless the developer
manages to recoup, through these tax breaks, the cleanup expenses earlier. All
of these techniques are examples of ways to increase subsequent returns for
investors.
Taking out general obligation bonds has enabled a number of cities to
acquire contaminated land, prepare sites, and make infrastructure improvements.
The bonds are backed by the general obligation of the cities or local development
authorities. They have contributed to the redevelopment of brownfield sites in
Chicago and Seattle. Another sort of bond-guaranteed with the extra tax
revenues expected to be raised from the higher value of remediated properties-
supplies the money for Tax-Increment Financing. A TIF project is an ideal
financing option for municipalities, since it is repaid from revenues that would not
have been generated otherwise. The main drawbacks are the high level of
technical expertise and time required for a TIF project, as well as the repayment
risk to the issuing municipality if the development fails or experiences cost
overruns.i In Wyandotte, Michigan, a TIF district formed in 1988 to clean up a
residential district now generates more than $5 million annually. Some of this
money has been devoted to redeveloping one contaminated site within the
district as a golf course. In Minneapolis, a TIF hazardous substance subdistrict is
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expected to bring in $10.3 million a year, which will be used to help remediate
another area plagued with brownfields.
Many government-instituted changes have reduced the initial cost of
investment by making site assessments available or providing money outright to
start a project. Most likely, future policies will address increasing subsequent
returns through such measures as making money available at market interest
rates or below. Some of the most important, and least expensive, changes may
be in clarifying existing regulations and in assigning responsibility for sites to
either state, or to federal, officials. Better defined regulations could have a
profound effect on reducing risk and volatility for investors, encouraging them to
invest more money in environmentally impaired sites.
Although municipalities cannot alter liability provisions or cleanup
standards, and have a limited ability to influence the regulatory process, they do
have significant tools at their disposal for promoting remediation. And, when they
are moving in the same general policy direction as other levels of government-
toward making brownfields a more desirable real estate purchase-they can
have a pronounced, positive effect. The current result is that government policy
has helped to create a climate in which capital is poised to flow into
environmentally impaired properties.
'Suklennik, Greg "Husky Picks Vermont," The Berkshire Eagle, August 29, 1996, p. 1.
Grolier Multimedia Encyclopedia, Waste Disposal definition, May 23, 1997.
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CHAPTER 3
A Comparative Study: How Capital Flowed into Distressed Real
Estate after the Savings and Loan Crisis
In the early 1990s, distressed real estate that surfaced during the Savings
and Loan crisis offered investors a prime opportunity. These properties, selling
at steep discounts, could be repositioned and resold at market prices that
generated impressive profits, often in excess of 20 percent. Today, the same set
of risk-taking investors who profited from the S&L crisis are looking for the next
asset class to invest in. Patrick Leardo, the principal at Coopers & Lybrand in
charge of real estate, has identified brownfields as perhaps representing this
opportunity: "Environmentally tainted properties may be the only area where you
can get legitimate, high double-digit returns."' Hence this chapter will examine
similarities and differences between brownfields and the distressed real estate
and loans that became available in the first half of the 1990s.
This will be done in the context of three areas critical to successful
investing in these kinds of challenging opportunities. First, investors must be able
to locate the particular assets available for purchase. Second, they need to draw
on more specialized knowledge than is required for traditional real estate
transactions. This knowledge allows them, in part, to rapidly and accurately
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determine the value of an asset once its cash flow is established. Last, and most
important, they must have access to capital willing to invest in risky assets.
The Savings & Loan Crisis and the Glut of Distressed Loans and Real Estate
The roots of the Savings and Loan crisis reach all the way back to 1980,
when there was disintermediation, or banks borrowing money at higher interest
rates than they charged for lending. That year, Congress removed the ceiling on
interest rates bankers could pay out and raised the federal insurance guarantee
on deposits from $40,000 to $100,000. Also, the national Bank Board began to
allow banks to accept brokered deposits. Money brokers reacted by splitting
large sums into smaller deposits, none of which exceeded the limit on the federal
guarantee. That gave the money managers a high-interest, zero-risk investment.
S&Ls vigorously competed for these new sources of funds by offering
increasingly higher interest rates, but their traditional loan portfolios of low-
paying, fixed-interest, single-family home mortgages failed to earn enough to
make their overall operations profitable. In 1980 the S&Ls had a collective net
worth of $32.2 billion, which by December 1982 had shrunk alarmingly to $3.7
billion.
The Bank Board responded with another quick fix. It lowered the reserve
requirement of S&Ls from five to three percent of assets. This change in
accounting requirements allowed thrifts becoming insolvent to appear sturdy and
healthy. And then, even though these thrifts had only a small fraction of the
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capital and reserve requirements of commercial banks, in 1982 Congress passed
the Garn-St. Germain Act, which permitted S&Ls to fill up to 70 percent of their
loan portfolios with nonresidential real estate and consumer loans. The state of
California took the deregulatory fervor even further, by letting their state-
chartered thrifts invest in anything from junk bonds to alternative energy
schemes. Thus, in California, thrifts hardly differed from venture capitalists, the
main distinction being that the losses of the former were guaranteed by the
federal government. As a result of these questionable policies, the debt at many
banks again exceeded the value of their assets, making them insolvent. One
estimate puts losses from bad real estate loans and investments at roughly 25
percent of the total cost of resolving failures at thrift institutions.
By the late 1980s the S&L industry was hemorrhaging billions of dollars
every year. Ironically, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC), created to smoothly liquidate insolvent S&Ls, became overwhelmed and
insolvent itself. In 1989 Congress stepped in and ended FSLIC, merging its
operations with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Then, in
August of that same year, the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) was formed,
which would preside over what would turn out to be the largest federal bailout in
United States history."
The RTC operated by using a three-phase resolution process. In the first
phase, it would be appointed conservator of an insolvent institution. During the
second phase, it fulfilled the government's standing pledge to protect insured
deposits by transferring them to one or more healthy institutions through a
process of marketing and competitive bidding. The final and longest phase was
receivership, in which the RTC managed and sold remaining bank assets so that
the outstanding liabilities could be discharged. All the resulting income went to
covering expenses and paying waiting creditors, with the RTC itself being the
largest creditor.
The RTC ended up taking over a total of 747 institutions, almost half of
those (318) in its first year. To fill the gap between its outlays and the estimated
net amount it could recover from asset sales, the RTC had to obtain $103.3
billion: $91.3 billion came from appropriations in four separate legislative acts,
and $12 billion was borrowed. The corporation then had to recover as much as
possible from its newly acquired assets, which had a book value of $456 billion.
This it did with varying degrees of success.
Mortgages constituted $188 billion of its holdings. For 1-4 family
mortgages, the trusted bedrock of the S&L industry since its beginnings in 1831,
the RTC recovered 96 percent of their worth. For all other types of mortgages
the RTC recovered 75 percent of par. Most of these mortgages had been issued
on guidelines drafted after the 1982 deregulation of financial institutions. The
RTC suffered the greatest erosion of value with its $31 billion of assets in the
category of Real Estate Owned (REO), in which it managed to recover only 55
percent of book value."' When the RTC sold real estate so cheaply, it not only
cost taxpayers more money to resolve the S&L crisis, but it also contributed to
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the steepest decline in commercial real estate values in U.S. history-more than
30 percent. It was one of several factors, which even included the collapse of the
Japanese stock market, that caused a disequilibrium of supply and demand that
led to the end of the real estate boom in 1990. In the early 1990s, the imbalance
became further skewed, with too many sellers and too few buyers. A vicious
spiral of declining prices ensued, as lenders felt increased pressure to sell, to
reduce risk and stem the tide of losses. By late 1992 nonperforming loans and
REO represented more than 35 percent of the real estate portfolios of the major
money center banks' in the country.v
Banks had a powerful motivation to rid themselves of this financial dead
weight. First, troubled loans are expensive to carry because not only do debtors
stop making payments, but also the asset requires cash infusions for taxes,
insurance, and maintenance. As for the real estate, federal risk-based capital
rules enacted in 1989 mandated that banks owning real estate hold larger capital
reserves. But, even with this strong motivation, selling their assets could be slow
and expensive, so banks and conservators resorted to bundling loans into
packages. In size, the packages ranged all the way from mortgages with a value
of a few hundred thousand dollars to a $1.7 billion assortment of assets that
Bank of America sold to Morgan Stanley in January of 1993. Sales proceeded
apace, but discounts of 50 percent from par were not uncommon.
1 These banks included Bank of Boston, Chase, Chemical Bank, First Chicago, and J.P. Morgan
& Co.
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The downward spiral in real estate, as in any asset class in a free market
economy, was ultimately self-correcting. The sudden glut of properties at fire-sale
prices attracted new investors, and as the market recovered, more and more
investors entered. Abundant new capital flowed in. Some of the money came
from traditional real estate investors, but even more went through existing, but
rarely exploited, channels.
These channels included securitization, in the form of public capital for
Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities (CMBS) and Real Estate Investment
Trusts (REITs), as well as private vulture funds (which specialized in distressed
assets). In February of 1992, Lehman Brothers brought to market the first
securitized real estate transaction of troubled assets, a $500 million CMBS
package of RTC loans.v At the same time REITs were using their large and
growing capital bases to acquire distressed properties. The new players in the
market were vulture funds, which bought both debt and equity. After earning
tremendous returns in 1991 and 1992, they were able to raise enormous
amounts of additional capital the following year.
Throughout the aftermath of the S&L crisis, investor groups snatched up
whatever distressed assets they could, and the Resolution Trust Corporation sold
as many as it could. Gradually, the real estate market recovered. When the RTC
finally closed its doors on December 31, 1995, its dividend payments to creditors
averaged 70 percent of the original claims. The remaining REO portfolio was
transferred to the FDIC with 1,091 of the properties containing hazardous
materials. Contaminated properties fell into one of ten identified hazard types
and represented a book value of $577 million, approximately 44% of the
remaining book value of the REO portfolio. v' The estimated cost to taxpayers for
the bailout, including future interest on the bailout debt is $417.3 billion. v" Since
thrifts have historically been located in the south and west, New England
accounted for less than 2 percent of the S&L expense, while states like Texas
(29 percent) and California (13 percent) needed much more assistance.
Separate from the RTC, the FDIC sold a large number of nonperforming
assets during the early 1990s. The FDIC was responsible for 1,254 banks that
failed from 1986 to 1995, with total assets of $228.4 billion.viii Six banks failed in
1995 compared to an average of five banks a year failing from the end of World
War 11 to 1980, the last year to have only six bank failures was 1977.'x The
estimated cost to the Bank Insurance Fund for the FDIC's failed banks is $30.4
billion. This money was not raised by taxes, but rather by temporarily increasing
the assessment rate on banks to approximately 25 cents per $100 of insured
deposits. x Even though the FDIC's receivership responsibilities were much less
expensive than the RTC's, they still added a lot of properties to the market,
18,146 REO properties from 1990 to May of 1992.x'
The RTC and FDIC, along with HUD and other government agencies,
contributed to a short-term glut of real estate for sale. This occurred because
they lacked the market knowledge and expertise to manage properties, and so
tried to dispose of them quickly. Investors, backed by new sources of capital,
responded swiftly with the needed knowledge and management skills and
grabbed up these properties at attractive prices. Now we will look at what
parallels can be drawn between the purchasing of distressed real estate in the
S&L crisis and emerging investment opportunities in brownfields. We will look at
three critical areas common to any venture: locating the assets, fulfilling the need
for specialized knowledge, and finally, raising the necessary capital.
Ability to Locate Assets
No matter which asset class is being considered, investors must be able
to identify a large number of potential acquisitions to be successful. This was
much easier with the distressed assets of the S&L crisis, which became available
through a predictable process. Many of the nonperforming mortgages and real
estate first came under the control of the RTC and its manager, the FDIC. The
conservators then proceeded to sell them, under strict guidelines enacted by the
U.S. Congress.
The Congressional intent was to ensure all assets would be made
publicly available so as to prevent insider deals. For real estate, properties had
to be listed with local brokers or, if auctions were held, appropriate display ads
had to appear in area newspapers. An interested party could even approach
conservators directly for a list showing properties being marketed, by type and
location. The RTC made announcements of bulk sales in national publications
such as the Wall Street Journal, and maintained a mailing list of investors to
notify. For their part, banks and thrift institutions aggressively promoted their own
foreclosed properties as well, even in some cases relying on in-house sales
departments.
Brownfields, however, pose a much greater challenge to locate. They are
at the moment almost a hidden asset class. Owners of these properties, which
tend to be classified as industrial use or empty land, shy away from the label
"brownfield" because the perception of contamination devalues the property and
frightens potential buyers away. Instead, the image may be soft peddled, as
when the seller of a multi-million dollar factory quietly subtracts the expected
remediation bill off the fair market value. Companies owning polluted parcels also
fear that advertising them as "brownfields" could draw unwanted public attention,
which might prompt enforcement actions from regulatory agencies and pressure
from environmental groups to undertake expensive cleanups. Some owners, in
fact, are reluctant to sell for another reason: the daunting prospect of continued
liability. Because of continued liability General Electric has stated flatly, "We're
not buying or selling contaminated real estate."x"
Complicating all this is the lack of concentration of ownership of
brownfields. The owners span the gamut, from the government, banks, and small
family-owned businesses, to Fortune 500 firms, utility companies, and
municipalities. Contrast this with the RTC, which in March of 1990 was the
largest property owner in the United States. It owned more than 35,000 parcels:
apartments, homes, office buildings, shopping centers, industrial tracts, and raw
land.x"' It openly advertised the sale of its assets as well.
Investors then must do a fair bit of investigating to discover the location of
choice brownfields. Forming relationships with industrial companies and banks
that still hold contaminated properties can provide leads. Also, public records at
state agencies show basic information like site name, address, type of
contamination, status of remediation, and whether an environmental assessment
has been done. Unfortunately, they do not give other crucial information that
investors need such as condition of property and its size, owner's name, or
assessed value. There are a few owners, such as the FDIC and some
municipalities, eager to sell brownfields. Also, the quarterly publication
Investment Properties has a section titled "Hazard Properties" that lists
contaminated sites for sale.
The Need for Specialized Knowledge to Determine Asset Value
In general, investing demands extensive knowledge of the asset class that
is being considered, in part to manage risk effectively. Also, on a specific case by
case basis, successful investors need to be able to quickly and accurately
determine the value of an asset, within a reasonable time frame, with a good
degree of accuracy. The need for specialized knowledge turns out to be critical in
the area of brownfields and distressed assets. Investing in the nonperforming
assets left over from the S&L crisis required an understanding of foreclosure law,
the local market (both the regional economy and the real estate market), and
how to work out loans. Investing in brownfields is even more complicated; an
investor also must know environmental law as it affects real estate, and
remediation techniques and associated costs.
A lack of specialized knowledge can prove costly; consider an investor
buying distressed assets whom is unfamiliar with foreclosure transactions. If he
calculates returns based on foreclosing on a property in six months, but the
owner then files bankruptcy and receives an automatic stay (making the
foreclosure dependent on court approval), an anticipated profit can turn into a
loss. And, as more complicated, and more numerous acquisitions are made, the
probability of making mistakes increases.2
With distressed assets, at least, doing the necessary background research
to avoid such mistakes was not very expensive. Conservators and banks
sometimes supplied investors with exactly what they needed to make educated
bids. A title commitment showed prospective buyers what property rights they
would be purchasing. An environmental assessment revealed the presence or
absence of contamination; an appraisal gave an idea of fair market value. These
documents, when not available, were relatively inexpensive for owners to
2 One investor, who did not want to be named, with more than 20 years of experience in
distressed real estate, once overlooked a sum of one million dollars in outstanding back taxes
when underwriting a pool of loans. This, along with another mistake, led to a $2.5 million loss on
the pool. This was extremely unusual for an investment group whose average profits on
distressed loans and real estate often exceeded 20 percent.
generate, at a cost of a few thousand dollars per asset. With due diligence in
hand, investors could either personally inspect a property or obtain a broker's
price opinion, then make a comparison to like sales. This usually sufficed to
determine value.
But the information was often scant, sometimes even inaccurate.'v This
problem could plague brownfields to an even greater degree, and to an even
riskier end. For example, an FDIC-owned loan, with a mortgage on a factory with
10 acres of land in Rhode Island, was identified as possibly needing $500,000 in
remediation. The case file for the loan contained environmental assessments that
cost a tremendous sum to produce, more than $90,000. Still, some of the most
difficult contamination to remove had not been thoroughly investigated, and
remained a risk that threatened to cause any cleanup to balloon into a multi-
million-dollar project."
A major problem with brownfields is that doing the background research to
determine remediation costs is both expensive and occasionally quite unreliable.
As a matter of course, a two-part environmental assessment has to be
undertaken. For a few thousand dollars, a Phase I report is produced to identify
whether contamination may be present. A Phase Il report, which can run into the
tens of thousands of dollars, then confirms the location and identity of hazards,
and sometimes makes recommendations for cleanup. These environmental
analyses are consistent in their style because, just as title insurance follows an
industry standard, the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) sets a
"Standard Practice for Environmental Site Assessments." But consistency itself is
of no utility if the Phase I and 11 reports have not been done at all, or a
prospective buyer has no confidence in them. In that case, before making a bid,
tens of thousands of dollars and several months of time would have to be sunk
into creating or redoing the reports. This creates a formidable barrier for
investors who want to examine and bid on large numbers of properties as they
did with distressed real estate and loans in the early 1990s.
With contaminated properties, the stakes are also greater. Brownfields,
unlike most classes of assets, hold the potential for losses that exceed the
original investment. An owner can find himself pulled, quicksand like, into
expensive, entangling, and deepening attachments for a property that needs
cleaning. Under current Superfund law, once an investor becomes a part of the
chain of title, he falls under the same strict liability as past polluters, regardless of
fault. Even when shielded by a corporate or limited liability company structure,
environmental justice enforcers can prosecute an individual investor if it is
determined he is an operator at the site. Though this situation is evolving, and
new laws could be enacted to limit liability, the gamble is still perceived as high.
As John Matteson at Aldrich, Eastman & Waltch (AEW) remarked: "Despite the
regulatory changes, acquiring sites requiring extensive cleanup is still like playing
Russian Roulette. Sooner or later you're going to take a bullet."Xi
Being able to judge the risk associated with cleaning up pollution is part of
the specialized knowledge that will be needed to execute successful brownfield
deals. A host of unknown costs will have to be quantified as much as possible.
How much will need to be paid to attorneys to navigate a maze of evolving
regulations? How expensive will be a cleanup up of tons of soil below the
surface? The accuracy of remediation estimates varies greatly. The figures for
cleaning up some contaminants, like petroleum from a leaking underground
storage tank, are probably accurate within 90 percent. But for sites with multiple
contaminants or polluted groundwater, the best guess put forward by engineers
may miss the mark by 50 percent or more""
Ultimately, the value of a brownfield will be calculated by subtracting
remediation and other costs from the fair market value, clean. That leaves many
brownfields, at the moment, in the position of perhaps not being profitable even if
given away. One estimate predicts that currently as many as 80 percent of sites
are unsuitable for redevelopment due to real estate conditions.""'
Where the Capital Comes From
As one of the most highly leveraged asset classes, real estate suffered
great losses in value when capital became scarce during the banking crisis. The
regular sources of capital-the money that used to come from banks or
insurance companies in the form of whole loans-simply dried up. But then, as
values dipped lower and lower, and the prospect of high returns became evident,
capital normally uninterested in real estate began to flow into the sector. The
brownfield situation is somewhat different: currently, much capital happens to be
available, at attractive interest rates. Yet a fundamental similarity exists, as
investors who tolerate risk well shop around for the next place to earn double-
digit returns. Meredith Kane, a real estate attorney at Paul Weiss Rifkind
Wharton & Garrison, noted in commenting on the source of the likely money for
speculative brownfield redevelopment: "This is the same opportunity money that
was looking at the RTC properties in the early Nineties and is now looking for
someplace else to go."
The exact vehicle through which capital will begin to flow into
contaminated properties remains unknown. One option successfully used by the
RTC to dispose of moderately risky assets involves public capital in the form of a
CMBS, which securitizes a pool of loans. For real estate companies willing to go
public, REITs, which were also used to buy distressed assets, represent another
vehicle. Companies have already considered establishing REITs for long-term
holding of several brownfields at a time. Though not a single CMBS or REIT has
yet been formed for contaminated real estate, each option holds promise.
Private equity is also available in the form of "vulture", or more politely,
"opportunity" funds. During the banking crisis, these funds raised capital from
more than one investor, and were patterned after hedge funds. As such, they
existed for only a very limited purpose, were not publicly traded, and were
composed of large multi-million dollar investments. With RTC assets, the limited
purpose was to buy and hold properties until the depressed market improved.
The opportunity funds were capitalized with money from sources ranging from
Harvard University's endowment to, ironically, the same pension funds that were
losing millions of dollars in bad real estate investments.
At the present time, it is estimated that about $10 billion in opportunity
funds held by companies such as Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and
Starwood, is poised to enter areas like speculative development, Canadian
investments and environmentally impaired properties.xx AEW's "Partners Fund,"
a commingled collection of investments by pension funds averaging $20 to $25
million apiece, bought assets such as the Sears Tower in Chicago. It is now
bridging the gap between investments in distressed properties and brownfields,
with its last deal being a $100-million commitment to purchase environmentally
impaired land. Out of the more than 20 parcels that have been examined, three
in Florida have been acquired for $15 million. Anticipated remediation expenses
for all three are estimated to total $300,000."x
Another common source of private equity, which was used to acquire
distressed assets, is money from wealthy families, entrepreneurs, and investors.
This source has been tapped into during every economic downturn this century,
and boasts the advantage of great liquidity, or ability to generate immediate cash.
Private capital is considered a very appropriate source for brownfields because
these risky and complex transactions often need to be judged carefully, on an
individual basis. Manhattan-based American Properties Corp. has bought 2.7
million square feet of brownfields, primarily with money from the wealthy
Ruttenberg family. Its investments have included $4 million for a vacant,
asbestos-filled supermarket warehouse situated on land contaminated with oil.
Another $4 million was spent for cleanup and now the 14-acre facility is used by
an apparel packer."'
Yet another source of capital could come from "sweat equity" on the part
of a remediation company. An example would be a contaminated site where a
developer identifies the highest and best use as a shopping mall. A remediation
company that can quickly identify a low-cost alternative to an expensive cleanup
can serve to reduce the initial cost of the investment. It may identify, for instance,
an engineering control, such as a parking lot with a thicker asphalt topping which
would act as a cap effectively limiting exposure to underlying contamination. A
developer could then afford to bid higher than the competition.
In fact, a number of real estate developers and hazardous waste
remediation firms have recently formed joint ventures."" One of the most active
teams is Dames & Moore/Brookhill, LLC. The environmental-engineering giant
Dames & Moore linked up with the New York City real estate firm, the Brookhill
Group, in the summer of 1996, in a 50-50 partnership. In March of 1997 their joint
team was the first to acquire a large portfolio of contaminated properties. They
paid $70 to $80 million to a Canadian life insurance company for 25 to 35 sites
across the United States.x"' Another partnership is between Koll Company, a
real estate management and advisory firm, and ENSR Corp., a consulting and
engineering firm. Together they have formed Koll ENSR Environmental Realty
Advisors (KEERA).
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Despite all the attempts so far to marshal capital for large purchases of
brownfields, the early evidence suggests that this asset class may not represent
as attractive an opportunity as distressed assets. The choice brownfields are
neither numerous nor easy to locate, and there is no urgency to unload them,
unlike with RTC properties. During the banking crisis, weekly auctions dispensed
of thousands of parcels and buildings. The banks and conservators, under
pressure to divest themselves of real estate quickly, offered tremendous
bargains. But the brownfield investor, after ferreting out available properties-
many of which are not actively being sold-must find an owner willing to sell.
This is no mean feat. Because of the continued liability threat, these owners often
insist on controlling the redevelopment of their properties, and they themselves
reap the increase in value that is created. Not surprisingly, to date there have
been very few intentional brownfield transactions; most are accidental, as when
an investor encounters unforeseen contamination on a purchased property.
Another huge difference between the asset classes lies in anticipated
profitability, partly as determined by prevailing market conditions. Many
distressed assets were income producing and sold well below replacement cost.
A typical case would be a strip mall, selling at half of its replacement cost, that
provided a twelve percent return with only 60-percent occupancy. It created value
in two ways: cash flow would increase all the way up to 100-percent occupancy,
and when the market bounced back, it would regain its worth. An added
consolation to the investor was the fact that, in a real estate downturn when
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properties sold for below replacement cost, the incentive for speculative
construction disappeared. Thus, no new, competing supply was being put on the
market.
But brownfields offer more perils to maintaining value than possibilities for
enhancing it. Many are raw land, or require an existing structure to be razed, so
there is no current cash flow, which puts the investment in the category of a more
traditional speculative development. And, without dependable revenue-
generating assets to fall back on, an investor faces risks such as losing take-out
financing or anchor tenants, and the prospect of cost overruns. Add to this the
real danger of runaway remediation costs and procedural time delays, and
brownfields become an even more dubious investment proposition. It seems
clear, at the very least, that they will not match the high-yield opportunities of
distressed real estate, where the government subsidized losses and the potential
benefits were substantial and easily identifiable.
Conclusion
As distressed assets once did, brownfields present opportunities for
investors, with certain limitations and caveats to be taken into account. It will
take years to develop a thorough database of comparable sales to act as a basis
of value, and even then differences in how individual states regulate the problem
of site contamination will have to be factored in. While capital is at the moment
available, investors will need risks minimized through changes in government
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environmental policy and through the availability of affordable, comprehensive
insurance before they will divert their dollars and attention to brownfields. If the
opportunities do not soon appear the capital will move into competing asset
classes that promise attractive profits.
Most of the capital to remediate and redevelop brownfields has historically
come from owners of contaminated sites. This is unlike the situation with
distressed properties, in which owners, often capital poor, were unable or
unwilling to invest additional money into properties. Two key reasons why
brownfield owners have willingly supplied the capital is the absence of any
buyers, and a desire to ensure a proper cleanup because of concerns about
ongoing liability. North American Realty Advisory Services, L.P. has rehabilitated
over 850 brownfields over the past 20 years for clients such as Exxon, Dow
Chemical, AT&T and Lehman Brothers."'v Lincoln Jewett, an executive vice
president who has worked for 25 years at the realty advisory service, predicts
owner capital will continue to be the most common source of money for future
redevelopment of brownfields.""
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POSSIBLE INVESTOR STRATEGIES FOR RAISING CAPITAL
FOR BROWNFIELDS
With brownfields, a critical question remains unanswered: Will the same
strategies that Wall Street firms employed to absorb distressed assets of the S&L
crisis work for these properties? First, it must be understood how CMBS, REITs,
and vulture funds operate, and then their appropriateness for brownfield
redevelopment will be examined. Industry experts who were interviewed on this
topic offered a range of opinions. They also commented on the type of capital
currently available, the type of investor best suited to take on redevelopment risk,
and why certain companies have so far declined to invest in contaminated
properties.
CMBS, REITs and Opportunity Funds
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) function in a way similar
to residential mortgages sold on the secondary market. Most residential
mortgages on one-to-four family homes, after being written, are bundled together
50
with other mortgages of the same type. They have all been made as risk-free as
possible, through appraisals, title insurance and appropriate legal documents.
Investors then buy bonds backed by the bundle of mortgages. They assume,
though this belief remains untested, that the full faith and credit of the United
States government insures the Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS).
This differs from a CMBS, which is guaranteed only by the credit worthiness of
the original mortgage holders. This element of uncertainty results in higher
interest rates, ceteris paribus, for a commercial borrower in a CMBS than for a
homeowner in an RMBS.
Because of the increased default risk, a CMBS is layered into a series of
usually five to ten "tranches." Upper tranches consisting of the best-rated bonds
carry very little risk; the yield from lower tranches is much more uncertain.
Investors in the uppermost, or senior tranche, have priority in receiving interest
payments from the ongoing cash flow of the portfolio mortgages, as well as first
rights to collecting any money if any of the assets are liquidated. Independent
credit-evaluating agencies such as Moodys always assign this relatively safe
senior tranche a AAA rating, the same as that of the best-rated corporate bonds.
Yet there is a small degree of repayment risk with CMBS, unlike with, for
instance, government-guaranteed Treasury bonds. Today, an investor in a
CMBS who holds a stake in the senior tranche draws roughly half a percentage
point higher in returns than does his counterpart who owns Treasury bonds,
though both investments are rated the same. The returns are much higher for the
lower CMBS tranches: these investors, who draw money only after the senior
levels are paid, and are the first to feel the impact of non-payments and defaults,
expect to be compensated for their precarious position.
The reason that these securitized offerings are so successful is because
they take maximum advantage of different appetites for risk. Most bond
investors want as little as possible, and a few want as much as possible,
provided they are well compensated for it. A CMBS efficiently captures both
classes of investors, by dividing cash flows from a pool of what are considered to
be moderately risky assets, such as commercial mortgages, into a large offering
of low-risk bonds and a small offering of high-risk bonds.
A CMBS composed of commercial mortgages on contaminated properties
would shift more of a burden onto the lower tranches, because of the greater
likelihood that a particular borrower would default. A rating agency such as
Moodys would simply make the top rated tranche smaller, and increase the size
of the lower tranche. But, if investors deemed the pool of mortgages extremely
risky, they would demand an interest rate too high to make creating a CMBS
worthwhile.
A Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) is structured differently. Many
REITs are private real estate companies that went public, issuing shares to be
bought and sold, in order to raise capital. Their real estate assets and prospects
for growth act as security for the stockholders, who receive regular dividends
from the REIT's after-tax income. All shares bear the same amount of risk and
earn the same returns.
The fundamental difference between a REIT and a CMBS is that the
former is like an open-ended fund: the mix of assets often changes. A CMBS,
though, is much closer to being a closed fund because it contains a bundle of
mortgages, the composition of which changes rarely-only when a mortgage is
paid off or foreclosed upon. Another difference concerns the potential for gain.
REIT investors reap the benefit of asset appreciation; the maximum profit a
CMBS investor can earn is easily calculated as the present value of all
payments, paid on time, with no defaults. The CMBS valuation is easier to arrive
at, because it is pure quantitative analysis, with the only unknown being how
many defaults will occur and when. Unlike with a REIT, there does not have to be
consideration of the competence of a management team that, through its
ongoing decisions about property sales and acquisitions, can impact shareholder
value greatly.
Opportunity, or vulture funds, specialize in buying distressed assets and,
like a CMBS or a REIT, are often set up by Wall Street companies such as
Lehman Brothers and Goldman Sachs. Their shares, however, generally never
trade publicly. Investors in these funds usually assign responsibility for buying
decisions to the fund managers; this concentration of authority makes it easier for
the fund to buy complex and risky assets such as contaminated properties. This
discretion also makes opportunity funds suited to making snap decisions to
snatch up assets being sold at "fire sale" prices. The investor's money is locked
in for an extended period of time, unlike with a REIT or a CMBS, both of which
feature liquidity from being a traded commodity on the stock market.
The Relevance of these Investment Vehicles to Brownfields
The backbone of this section is a series of interviews with nine experts
who understand environmentally impaired properties and financing. Each expert
was asked: What changes have prompted more capital to flow to brownfields
recently? Where has this capital come from? What will be needed to encourage
an even greater investment, and what obstacles must be overcome? What
investment vehicles might play a role?
Most interviewees doubted that a CMBS would be a viable option for
securitizing a portfolio of brownfield mortgages. It would be impossible, they
remarked, to calculate the Loan To Value (LTV) ratio when the remediation is not
well quantified, making it hard to ascertain the underlying value of the CMBS
package. There was a consensus that rating agencies would overcompensate
for these murky risks. Another problem mentioned was the ongoing monitoring of
cleanups necessary for an agency like Moodys, in case it had to lower the bond
rating to reflect additional hazards.
But, insurance could be used in the same way it covers, say, loss by fire,
to mitigate poorly defined environmental risks. Or, after a complete remediation,
a property's mortgage could be slipped into a traditional pool of holdings and
should have little, if any effect on a CMBS rating. David Jacobs at Nomura said
that his company would place the mortgage of a formerly tainted site in a CMBS,
just as long as the remediation is complete and the proper regulatory agency has
agreed to take no further action.
One exception to the pessimistic views about the suitability of the CMBS
vehicle for brownfields was Jay Vassell, vice president at Equitable. He thought
that moving from its historical role dealing with distressed real estate to
brownfields was a natural transition. He envisioned a hybrid kind of CMBS.
Environmental bonds would be created, then once the properties were cleaned
up, these bonds would be convertible to shares of real estate equity, through the
initial use of a participating mortgage.
A regular CMBS for unremediated brownfields, though not mentioned by
any of the interviewees, might work. This assumes first that the properties carry
appropriate environmental insurance, and second that some produce income.
And, similar to real estate considered speculative during the early 1990s,
brownfields may turn out to carry much less risk than is currently believed, once
a more knowledgeable marketplace develops. A pure brownfield CMBS would
be a powerful tool for acquiring numerous contaminated properties, and thus
would permit greater flexibility in raising capital to buy them.
With a "contaminated" CMBS, buyers of the lower tranches would get
higher returns to compensate for the additional risk of the owner's abandoning
the site, if unable to complete a costly remediation. Presumably, insurance would
always cover the cost of finishing a cleanup, but investors would still suffer a loss
in value from the foreclosure. Purchasers of the senior tranches would accept
the same return as for an uncontaminated CMBS, if the cash flow is secure and
rating agencies protect them by increasing the size of subordinated levels below
them. Hence, junior tranches would be larger. If experience proves that only a
slightly higher likelihood of losses exists for a "contaminated" CMBS than for a
regular one, a patient investor with deep pockets, who seizes the opportunities
early, might profit handsomely from the higher built-in returns.
A REIT was seen as a more suitable way to hold brownfields than a
CMBS. Aldrich, Eastman & Waltch (AEW) has considered forming one, possibly
five years from now, for the assorted environmentally impaired properties it plans
to purchase for $100 million. Still, even the REIT has numerous flaws. Most
experts mentioned that it would work only with access to expertise, in-house or
not, that is knowledgeable about remediation. A joint venture with a remediation
firm would solve this problem, but leave others to cope with. For example, REITs
generally have a lot of pressure to generate income because investors often buy
into them knowing that, by law, they must pay out 95 percent of their income
annually. But a brownfield vacant during a long-term cleanup would not have any
income and, worse, even drain monies from other profit-making properties. The
difficulty of estimating costs for cleanup and other risks is another discouraging
factor. If there is little or no confidence in these numbers, investors may
overcompensate by paying much less for the stock than its value, which would
drive down the price of individual shares.
At the moment it seems unlikely that a REIT will be established exclusively
for brownfields. A more likely scenario is for a REIT that holds a portfolio of
otherwise unimpaired real estate to acquire a property where the contamination
situation has been satisfactorily addressed. The Beacon REIT in Boston, in fact,
is in the process of acquiring a property with groundwater pollution because the
owner, Hewlett Packard, will indemnify the REIT by agreeing to assume
responsibility for future remediation costs.'
The most likely source of brownfield capital, financial experts agreed, will
be opportunity funds. Historically, this kind of money has proven the most willing
to bare greater risks for the promise of higher returns. Opportunity funds are
thought to be more adaptable, independent, and entrepreneurial, all crucial
characteristics for redeveloping problem properties that require many individual
decisions to be made quickly. Some fund managers have virtually unrestricted
discretion to invest money in brownfields, without consulting participating
investors.
Opportunity funds will not be fluid, and investments will have to be locked
in for up to several years, especially if the regulatory agencies lack sureness of
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process. In all probability, investors will be wealthy individuals who can afford to
have a sum of money tied up for a while. Beyond this, one basic difficulty noted
for opportunity funds was a possible scarcity of attractive acquisitions, because
owners often choose to remediate their properties themselves to minimize
losses.
The role Wall Street firms would play in brownfield redevelopment is
speculative at this point. Interviewees agreed that if considerable money could be
made from this asset class, investment concerns and dealmakers would find a
way to be involved, such as brokerage houses' acting as underwriters for
customary fees. Wall Street firms could also step in as a last-resort source of
major capital if traditional avenues, such as banks, are restricted from lending
because of FDIC requirements that limit permissible exposure to environmental
risk. This would be somewhat analogous to what happened on the lending scene
in the early 1990s, when capital for real estate from banks and insurance
companies slowed to a trickle. After decades of minimal involvement with
commercial real estate, Wall Street firms saw a profit-making opportunity, and
seized it. Again, the financiers of Wall Street may see the possibility of earning
high returns on brownfields, and turn their attention to exploiting these once
shunned properties.
An Analysis of Capital that has Already Managed to Flow to Brownfields
For a good decade now, capital has been available to remediate
contaminated properties. As has been previously noted, a substantial portion
came voluntarily from property owners themselves. More recently municipalities
and redevelopment agencies have raised the money. Other sources of capital
have been institutions such as investment bank First Boston, which is prepared
to lend Dames Moore/Brookhill LLC $200 million, and Morgan Stanley, which has
considered putting up $200 million for Koll ENSR Environmental Realty Advisors
(KEERA) that, if leveraged three times, would make $800 million available. Also,
certain banks have consistently written loans for brownfields.
P&C Bank in New Jersey has enjoyed success by quietly lending money
for contaminated sites, such as one in a city that wanted a hotel constructed on
the grounds. The bank financed the job because the municipality, which wanted
the project to revitalize an area, shouldered the risk of default. P&C has come a
long way since it first considered accepting loans secured by brownfields. It had
to convince its own skeptical credit policy managers of the worthiness of the idea,
which it did by breaking down complex risks into simple components. Then each
risk was shown to be adequately addressed-through abating contamination, for
example, or using legal measures to protect against future threats. P&C Bank
believed itself to be astute in dealing with real estate. It was willing to lend on
underlying cash flows such as lease payments for existing buildings, or the solid
track record of a successful developer. Even so, the bank carefully monitored
loans secured by brownfields. If a serious problem raised the prospect of default,
officials tried to salvage as much value as possible through a workout, knowing
that a foreclosure was very undesirable. P&C did not want to acquire a
contaminated parcel."
Being approved for such a loan depends, as with any other type of loan
from P&C Bank, on a borrower's credit worthiness. With environmental risks the
in-house staff takes into account the effect of four discrete factors. The first is
liability: How would the borrower be affected financially by an EPA enforcement
action, a citizen lawsuit, or an employee lawsuit that results from exposure to
contamination? Second is the cost of remediation; this must be narrowed down
to a tight range with a slim margin of error. Third is the element of time, or
having reliable schedules for such matters as receiving approval from state
agencies. Fourth is "bad science": Could predictions and plans be based on
inaccurate remediation criteria or data?
After a thorough review, the decision is made, with the market interest rate
the same as it would be if the property were free of contamination. The bank
must consider itself comfortable with everything known, and even unknown,
about pollution at the site. It cannot afford many misjudgments. If only five
percent of its loans were to fail, with no money recovered, the bank would
become insolvent.
P&C is a leader in this type of specialized lending, but is not alone. In its
dealings, another institution, BankBoston, tends to be more conservative and
cautious. It requires knowing the remediation costs, and prefers being assured
that insurance will absorb any overruns. It also feels secure issuing a loan on a
contaminated property if protected by a strong indemnification from a well-
capitalized entity, such as an oil company. And, like most others, BankBoston
will loan against a cleaned property once a tightly worded, comprehensive
covenant not-to-sue has been granted by the state.
A bank loan is a traditional source to turn to for capital, but there are
miscellaneous others. Large accounting firms like Coopers & Lybrand and Ernst
& Young have raised private investment funds to rehabilitate contaminated
properties owned by their clients. Bruce Amos, an insurance broker for ECS, has
noticed of late he has been selling many environmental policies to Limited
Liability Companies (LLCs) that are securing redevelopment money from their
parent companies. Private investors represented by investment brokers and
62
advisers may be niche players in the market, according to one expert, when $50
million or less in capital is needed."'
Sometimes investigating the history of a site yields a source of funds. An
inner city church in California, after thoroughly searching the background of its
own scarred property, found prior involvement on the part of an industry giant:
General Electric. GE, negotiating through a private advisor working pro bono for
the church, agreed to make a "donation," while denying any responsibility for the
contamination.'"
The question of who is best suited to take on brownfield risk, for the least
cost, elicited a wide variety of replies. One suggestion was major environmental
firms, because of their access to historical data on cleanup costs, experience
with regulators, and ability to do unexpected cleanups at cost. Another answer
was the lone entrepreneur who, unencumbered by bureaucratic structure, can
more easily make the flurry of decisions, such as whether to use an innovative
remediation technique for newly discovered pollution. Wealthy individuals were
also cited, because they can personally judge complicated transactions, but it will
be very important for them to erect a safety firewall between any unlimited risk
tied to the brownfield, and their other assets.
Another interviewed expert thought that redevelopment authorities, as
government entities, possessed the most advantages. They usually have local
monies appropriated for their use and often can draw on federal grants. Unlike
private developers, they do not have to show a profit, but rather can concentrate
on redeveloping an area and creating jobs. They usually have valuable political
connections, at the local and state level. Redevelopment authority members are
frequently from the municipality that they serve, so they know local remediation
companies and may know environmental regulators assigned to their area.
The question of why investment companies have so far shied away from
the brownfield market drew two main responses: lack of experience or
knowledge, and fear of unlimited losses. To overcome the knowledge gap,
interviewees proposed joint ventures where sources of capital matched up with
experienced brownfield developers and and/or skilled remediation companies. As
for handling loss, this is a serious concern. Some clients of AEW's "Partners
Fund" wanted to be assured that in the worst case scenario there was no way a
remediation could run through the entire fund and gain access to the deep
pockets of the pension funds. This worry was resolved by having an independent
consultant review the Phase 11 reports and confirm that the proposed remediation
was sufficient, and by having insurance that neutralized any substantial risk.
But hefty sums of capital could be squeezed toward brownfields by virtue
of tightening opportunities in other asset classes. Charlie Wu, managing director
of the Harvard Private Capital Group, likened the present competitive market,
and its narrowing investment opportunities, to an elementary school dance.
When all but a few appear to be dancing, anyone seeking a partner has to
choose from those on the sidelines, who otherwise might be rejected as rather
unappealing and unattractive. Though Wu said that his group has declined to buy
contaminated properties, out of concern about spiraling losses, it has
nevertheless considered them. A key factor is to control unlimited loss, which can
be done with adequate insurance, which is the subject of the next chapter.
Matteson, John, KEERA, personal interview, June 16, 1997.
" Noble, Steve, Department Head of Environmental Services, P&C Bank, personal interview, June
16, 1997.
"' Salmon, Mike, Director of Exit Strategies, TRC Co., personal interview, June 18, 1997.iv Ward, Elizabeth, President, Washington Advisors, personal interview, June 17, 1997.
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CHAPTER 5
ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE AND ITS ROLE IN BROWNFIELD
REDEVELOPMENT
Insurance acts as an important transfer mechanism for contaminated
properties, shifting risk onto insurance companies. It is appealing to investors
because it reduces their risk and volatility, though at a tradeoff: annual premiums
do decrease subsequent returns. For policies to be written, however, the risks
must be insurable, and the insurance itself marketable. Both preconditions can
be dependent on government policy, while marketability is influenced somewhat
by third parties, such as lenders, who may refuse to issue a loan without some
form of insurance. Furthermore, in the area of brownfields, having insurance for a
site confers spillover benefits. It provides a greater measure of protection for the
community, reassurance to regulatory agencies concerned about pollution
cleanup, and indemnification from legal action for previous property owners
provided, of course, that the insurer remains solvent.
The Experience of the Insurance Industry with Environmental Contamination
Insurance has been around close to 4,000 years, since its inception in
ancient Mesopotamia. The first insurers assessed premiums against maritime
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shipping costs to cover the loss of a craft at sea; insurance has been used to
spread risk ever since then.' In doing so, it also smoothes out the volatility a
merchant would otherwise suffer in sudden, unexpected catastrophes. In the
United States in the early 1800s, a typical policy for New England mill owners
covered only fire, and was written by a mutual insurance company formed by the
insured parties themselves. Policies evolved over time, and eventually were sold
primarily by private companies and covered all commercial risks, including
environmental contamination. But only within the last 30 years has society placed
pollution cleanup high on its agenda of concerns, and insurance companies
never envisioned how costly this change in attitude would be. " In 1973, with
tough new environmental regulations raising the specter of long lawsuits and
expensive judgments, insurers began to exclude coverage for such risks.
Companies selling Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) policies had not
priced their premiums to cover the billions of dollars in pollution-related claims
that would arise. The change in U.S. environmental policy over the past few
decades has continued to be costly. In October of 1995, Standard & Poor's
estimated the contractual liability of the casualty insurance industry, simply for
exposure under the Superfund program, to be $40 billion. A.M. Best estimates
industry exposure to environmental claims, including asbestos, to be as high as
$92 billion."'
The reason insurance companies are still responsible for pollution caused
decades ago, is because their policies up until the mid-1980s covered
environmental damage with "occurrence" language. In other words, coverage
became effective if the release or threat of release of contamination occurred
during the policy period. The statute of limitations on making claims often spans
30 years, so a policy active during the late 1960s can still be collected on. For
contaminated sites where owners are insolvent, uncooperative, or not anywhere
in sight, "insurance archeology" is even used to try to dig up the old policies. In
the mid 1980s, insurance companies switched to more restrictive "claims made"
language for environmental risk, so coverage applies only for "claims made"
during the policy year that a premium is paid.'v
Insurers, burned once by unanticipated changes in environmental
regulations, only gradually began offering coverage again for site-related
contamination. In 1980, American International Group, Inc. (AIG), an insurer with
over 75 years experience with commercial and industrial customers, made
available one environmental insurance product. In 1985 other pioneers in the
industry began to fill the gap in coverage left by the now standard exclusion of
environmental liability in regular policies. v In 1987, one new type of third-party
coverage was developed for bodily injury or property damage caused by
contractors doing asbestos abatement. Premiums grew to $100 million by 1992,
representing 20 percent of the $500 million environmental insurance business.
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Today, AIG offers more than 20 specialized types of niche insurance, including
coverage for hazardous waste that is spilled during transportation and first-party
protection for business interruption that somehow results from on-site pollution.
Environmental Contamination as an Insurable and Marketable Risk
A specific type of insurance will be issued only if it meets two
preconditions. The event to be covered must be first of all insurable, which
means a premium can be set that accurately reflects the degree of risk. Then, the
policy itself needs to be marketable: businesses or individuals must be willing to
buy the product at a premium that provides the issuer an opportunity to earn a
profit.
For brownfields, the problem of insurability has been answered in part with
a shift in the mid 1980s to "claims made" coverage, which is limited to
unforeseen future events. Environmental insurance today does not apply
retroactively to known on-site pollution, only to any new contamination that is
discovered. Obviously, as a preliminary measure, insurers demand that a
thorough site assessment be conducted.
As well as limiting their exposure to risk, insurers initially had to price
policies higher than what might be considered reasonable, to compensate for a
lack of historical claims experience. Unlike with auto, fire and life insurance, there
is no statistically valid information on the probability and magnitude of loss for
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most environmental risks. Since traditional actuarial techniques cannot be used
to calculate potential claims, methods of loss assessment rely on scientific and
engineering studies. As more policies are written, and claims made, insurance
companies will create the historical database to set premiums more precisely,
and inexpensively.
Another pricing variable, that of the effect of government policy, lies
outside the control of insurers. When faced with ambiguity, companies charge
higher premiums to cover uncertainty. Thus, well-specified, consistent, and
reasonable government standards play a critical role in the success of
environmental insurance products. If the EPA, for instance, drastically tightened
cleanup standards, insurers would have to raise rates or stop offering coverage
as they did in the 1970s. Or, if federal policy and state guidelines were shifting
frequently, insurance policy coverages and prices would have to be frequently
reassessed, which would be unduly cumbersome.
Once a company has deemed an environmental risk insurable and settled
upon a premium cost, the policy itself still must be marketable to succeed. Too
many potential customers must not reject the coverage as insufficient, overpriced
or unneeded. A captive pool of customers is sometimes delivered by government
regulations, as with asbestos abatement firms, which are required to have
insurance. "' A third party can also contribute to demand, as financial institutions
do by mandating title insurance and even occasionally environmental liability
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coverage before granting a loan. Generally, businesses that are self-motivated to
seek insurance have limited assets and/or an aversion to risk. They are willing to
pay a premium to protect against a large loss, however their ability to pay often
limits them to a relatively small premium.
For brownfield redevelopment, insurance is particularly important. It can
entice investors to purchase contaminated properties, which they would
otherwise avoid if they were subject to potentially catastrophic losses. In writing
policies however, insurers have to be wary of the problem of adverse selection.
Adverse selection occurs when the cost of a premium, though based on the
average probability of a typical loss, attracts only the poorer risks. Insurance
companies then lose money. With brownfields, insurers have addressed this
problem by requiring a minimal environmental review of the site. This system is
being counted on to screen out the worst properties.
One broad advantage of environmental insurance is that it has spillover
benefits. It supplies a source of funds for additional cleanup at a site, if needed. It
requires identifying contamination through prescreening, and continues to closely
monitor the activities of the policyholder. Insurers of Underground Storage Tanks
(USTs), for example, demand that monitors be placed on site to identify leaking
tanks, which then can be repaired before much damage is done. Similar before-
the-fact (ex ante) remedies are expected for most types of environmental
insurance.
In handling remediation efficiently, insurance companies have proven
superior to the government. By making private market decisions, they spend a
greater proportion of money on actually removing pollution, rather than on
transaction costs such as litigation expenses and engineering studies. Under
CERCLA liability, the insurance industry devoted 58 cents of every dollar to
actual cleanup, while that figure was only 40 cents for the government.""'
Different Types of Policy Coverage for Brownfields
Four types of policies can most obviously benefit brownfield owners,
purchasers, and investors: property transfer liability, third party liability, stop loss,
and contractor/consultant. At the moment, three insurance companies offer
these, with new providers entering the market and the existing ones expanding
their product lines all the time. The principal insurers are AIG, the largest of the
three; Reliance Insurance Group; and Zurich American Insurance Company. In
developing insurance for environmental contamination, the significant issue is its
marketability. " A stable regulatory environment, and improving historical data on
cleanup costs, have eliminated insurability as a concern.
Property transfer liability (PTL) insurance is very similar to title insurance
for commercial property. Both handle future claims arising from a problem
discovered after property transfer and not identified by a professional during
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initial review. PTL differs in that it covers the owner not for the duration of
ownership, but for a limited period of generally one to five years.
To sell PTL policies, insurance companies cite statistics like the following:
a study of 9,000 sites revealed that the contamination rate for commercial
properties averaged about 12 percent nationally; further, and more unsettling,
some 40 percent of the site assessments were found to be inaccurate. X Industry
data also highlights the steep expense of undertaking cleanups. The average
cost of remedial action ranges from $102,000 for underground storage tanks to
just over $33 million for NPL sites (all in 1991 dollars). The warning message is
being heard. Since being introduced in 1992, sales of PTL insurance have
become approximately a $5-10 million business annually, insuring $1.5 billion
worth of property. x' Of course the market would be even larger, and the cost of
policies cheaper, if PTL insurance was somehow made a part of the requirement
to close on a property. The cost would be absorbed into a myriad of other
expenses. As it stands, PTL insurance is sold only to purchasers who have
addressed any problems identified in a Phase I report, which acts as a
preacquisition site assessment. The assessment became popular among buyers
after the FDIC mandated that banks conduct screening as part of environmental
due diligence. The FDIC wanted to prevent banks from risking insolvency due to
foreclosing on loans secured by worthless assets. Insurers would have an even
larger market if banks required borrowers to not only do the site assessment, but
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also purchase PTL insurance dependent on the results. Without a provision such
as this, insurers found out early on that many assessments were being done,
with few policies sold. What would happen often is that the site did not appear to
be polluted, or the future remediation did not seem to be very expensive, so the
borrower would not purchase insurance on their own accord.
Property transfer liability coverage has caught the attention of agencies
like Standard & Poor's, which rate debt instruments such as CMBS on the basis
of real estate cash flows. Such agencies look favorably upon PTL insurance
because it shores up a commercial property portfolio by removing the risk of a
catastrophic loss from a later discovery of pollution. As demand for this particular
type of insurance grows, and more policies are written, insurers have managed
to create a database related to their losses. This information helps to establish
parameters and pricing for the next three types of coverage.
Third-party liability addresses bodily injury or property damage occurring
on site, or off the site by the migration of contamination. This protects owners
against lawsuits for such things as actual physical injury or diminished value of
an adjoining property, onto which pollution leaks or migrates. As with most
liability insurance, the insurer pays for court costs and any awards up to a pre-
specified limit.
Stop loss insurance, which places a cap on the share of cleanup costs
that has to be shouldered by the new owner, has been available for only less
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than a year. Fewer than 100 policies have been sold;,x" they have been
considered expensive and demand has been modest. Premiums vary depending
on the type and the extent of contamination present, but generally run five to
eight percent of the anticipated remediation expense-1 0 percent of which
constitutes a typical deductible. Hence, a $250,000 remediation project might
generate a $12,000 to $20,000 yearly policy, with loss coverage that can be
tapped into once expenses exceed $275,000.
For the last type of insurance, remediation contractors, consultants or the
property owner himself can purchase protection from mistaken acts or wrongful
omissions on the part of the contractor and environmental consultant. This works
like a standard errors or omissions policy. Covered situations might include that
of an outside contractor who accidentally fills a foundation site with contaminated
soil, or an environmental consultant who neglects to include a report, during the
regulatory permit process, that reveals the presence of an area of contamination.
A rule of thumb has developed for all types of environmental liability
insurance: for one year, for coverage of $1 million, the premium should be $12-
15,000.x. Deductibles currently range from a low of $5,000 to a high of
$250,000. Investors have been willing to pay these prices, to eliminate most of
the undesirable risk and volatility associated with brownfield redevelopment.
Insurance also reduces cost of capital because lenders charge lower rates when
assured that the borrowed money is as secure as that which flows into a pristine
greenfield.
With insurance, it suddenly seems feasible to redevelop some of the
nation's 450,000 brownfield sites. Insurers have assumed the risks that could
have wiped out all but a large development company. Bruce Reshen, president
of Dames/Moore Brookhill said his company's environmental insurance policy
from AIG was key to purchasing the portfolio of properties that it did in the spring
of 1997. x'v Similar deals will most likely follow if there are favorable changes in
regulatory policy, a free access to capital that is knowledgeable about the full
panoply of risks related to brownfields, and-to make the risks manageable-
good insurance.
'Freeman, Paul K. and Howard Kunreuther, Managing Environmental Risk Through Insurance,
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell, MA, 1997, p. 21.
" Ibid. pp. 4,22.
Dinsmore, Clement, "State Initiatives on Brownfields," Urban Land, June 1996, p. 38.
v McGregor, Gregor I., "Buying and Selling Dirty Property," Massachusetts Environment,
December 1995, p. 10.
v Freeman, Paul K. and Howard Kunreuther, p. 55.
Vi Ibid. p. 72.
V" Ibid. p. 25.
"'" Freeman, Paul K. and Howard Kunreuther, p. 26-27.
'x Ibid. p. 75.
x Ibid. pp. 78.




xV Coffey, Laura T., "Firm Buys Brownfield Portfolio," Daily Joumal of Commerce, March 17,
1997.
CHAPTER 6
Priming the Future Flow of Capital to Brownfields
This concluding chapter will consider a hypothetical, best-case scenario of how capital
could be encouraged to flow to brownfields. The scenario will be broken down and analyzed to
show how simple measures and policies, when viewed in the aggregate, could have a
substantial impact. All elements of this hypothetical example are either currently in effect, or
have been proposed in some form. The second half of the chapter will then look at the future
movement of capital into brownfields, and what changes need to occur to improve prospects
for investment.
A Hypothetical and Idealized Investment Scenario
A future brownfields transaction, under ideal conditions, could very well
transpire as follows: A partnership consisting of two companies-one in real
estate and the other in remediation engineering-identifies an environmentally
impaired property advertised on an Internet site devoted to selling hazardous
parcels.' They request from the owner, then receive and review, the
standardized Phase I and II reports and other relevant information. The highest
and best use for the abandoned site, the partnership decides, is as an assembly
plant for personal computers. Partnership officers consult well-defined state
regulations for Risk Based Corrective Actions (RBCA) 2, which link remedation to
future use. They determine that, if they agree to accept deed restrictions that lock
in the intended industrial purpose, they can save $1 million from what was
recommended in the Phase 11 cleanup. They then enter into a Prospective
Purchaser Agreement (PPA) with the state regulatory agency, which follows strict
sureness of process guidelines and guarantees, if the property is acceptably
clean in 18 months, to issue a covenant not-to-sue over future site
contamination. They shop around for a reasonably priced insurance policy that
covers cost overruns, and which has policy extensions to handle for the next 15
years any third party liability or state-required additional remediation. A state-
administered revolving-loan fund, with federal backing, supplies a two-year loan
for acquisition and remediation. The sum will be repaid with interest by a
mortgage originator once the site is clean; the originator will resell the mortgage
so it can be securitized into a CMBS, along with mortgages on unimpaired
properties.
Finally, the partnership acts to seal the deal. The insurance policy has
already granted the owner indemnity from all future liability. Now the partnership
team sweetens the amount of its bid, so as to exceed any previous one. The
higher offer is subsidized, in part, by a pair of governmental incentives on the
1 This exists at "brownfields.com" but the web site owner says that he has not attracted any listings in the year he I
owned the site, although he attributes this to not pursuing the business.
2 Risk Based Corrective Action is a cleanup that considers a property's planned future use to
determine how to protect identifiable human and environmental receptors from the pathways such
as air and water flow
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table: for five years, while a municipality abatement holds constant the valuation
of the property, a state tax credit can be taken for $500 per new job.
An Analysis of the Hypothetical Scenario
The preceding scenario features a win-win situation. A property that the
owner possibly fenced off, creating a community eyesore and a nonproducer of
tax revenue, is cleaned up and consequently poses less of a risk to neighbors
and the environment. The cost to the federal, state, and local governments is
minimal. The government-backed loan is repaid with interest; the city loses
nothing with the abatement if the alternative would be a property lying fallow; and
the tax credit is easily justified by increased payroll taxes from the new assembly
plant jobs.
For investors, the scenario is attractive because the enticements coincide
with their three primary objectives. First, using RBCA lowers the initial cost of the
investment by $1 million. Second, subsequent returns are increased through
reduced property and income taxes, as well as the ability to secure take-out
financing at market rates. Third, risk is lessened in several ways, for several
parties. Insurance offers security to the buyer, lender, regulatory agency, and
last to the community, which is reassured that the property will be cleaned up if
any pollution reappears. Furthermore, the PPA identifies for the buyer and the
insurance company the extent of the needed cleanup, and sureness of process
eliminates timing risk. A project being thrown off schedule can be a serious
setback. A redevelopment that lasts too long can lose its tenants and take-out
financing and contractor commitments, any of which can cause the undertaking
to collapse and go bankrupt.
Conceivably, the scenario can be faulted on the grounds that it does not
ensure that the party truly responsible for the pollution pays its due. But as can
be seen all too clearly with 17 years of Superfund-related litigation, it is no mean
feat to bring a polluter to justice, and then to extract fees for remediation. What
the past has shown, according to the American Academy of Actuaries, is that of a
total of $2 billion in public and private money devoted yearly to cleanups, about
$900 million never purifies so much as a cubic inch of soil.' Instead, it goes to
pay attorneys.
Everything mentioned in this hypothetical example currently exists, but
unfortunately, not in one geographic locale. Missouri, for example, adheres to a
timely schedule for processing brownfield paperwork. In Rhode Island, a Clean
Land Fund acts as a private-market equivalent of a revolving-loan fund. Much of
the capital contemplating investments in contaminated properties is now waiting
to see what workable combination of factors emerges in a single place. Recent
deals that involve private money will serve as test cases. How they turn out, and
how individual states accommodate the brownfield investor, will influence other
entrepreneurs who for now are taking a cautious, wait-and-see approach.
What the Future Holds
In environmentally impaired properties, investors surely have an
opportunity, though not of the same magnitude, or in the same locations, as with
distressed assets in the early 1990s. The RTC and FDIC mainly had holdings in
the south, because of a downturn in the oil industry, and in the West and
Northeast, because of a decline in the real estate markets there. Brownfields,
however, are highly concentrated in a rectangular-shaped belt with the cities of
Boston, Baltimore, St. Louis, and Minneapolis at the four corners. The presence
of rust-eaten hulks of buildings and weed-choked industrial lots makes them
more visible, " but not as tempting as acquisitions, on the whole. Many of the
properties have a negative value, even after changes in government regulations.
An improving regulatory climate has made some brownfield investment
feasible. After the failures of Superfund, the EPA has proven more willing to work
with private investors for remediation projects. In the last 15 years, Superfund,
EPA's largest project ever, funneled more than $30 billion into cleaning toxic
waste sites, with disappointing results"' More contaminated properties are
believed to exist today than in 1980. Accrued liability for environmental risks on
real property is estimated at $2 trillion, or 16 to 20 percent of the total $10 to $12
trillion in value of all property in the United States.v
Now, market observers predict that the brownfield market will bloom in two
to three years.v Still, the anticipated efflorescence has been slow to occur
because of the unwillingness of sellers and investors to operate under current
regulations. Until the EPA delivers on additional promises to lower regulatory
hurdles and limit liability, daunting risks will hinder the remediation and sale of
brownfield sites.v'
Yet much has changed, developers do agree, since the 1980s when a
prospective buyer, upon learning of environmental problems on a property, would
abruptly terminate negotiations.i" The knee-jerk revulsion is gone, and although
many investors still avoid contaminated land, there are some savvy capitalists
who understand how to limit their exposure to potential losses. And at this
historical moment, with the thriving real estate market, a strong economy, and a
scarcity of greenfields, there is abundant capital chasing after shrinking real
estate opportunities. Brownfields could well meet the new demand.
Now is an excellent time for government to lend an assist in creating a
suitable environment for investment. Four months ago, U.S. Congressmen
Greenwood and Klink introduced a bill to amend CERCLA. It would eliminate
federal involvement when a state has in place a voluntary response program
approved by the EPA, with the only exceptions being current or proposed NPL
sites, and properties that are federally owned or involved in a consent decree.vi
This fairly simple amendment would calm developers by clarifying the regulatory
relationship; no longer would they have to fear the meddlesome intrusion of
federal enforcers. Nearly 40 states have passed significant legislation to address
the issue of voluntary cleanups, with almost all of the others working on new laws
and policies.x
On the municipal level, governments could help by identifying sites and
acting as a local information clearinghouse. City officials could explain to
developers how the state regulations work, or how insurance can eliminate the
risk of liability. Municipalities could also provide direct opportunities by selling
city-owned brownfields. They could ease the burden of financing with tax
abatements, or even Tax Increment Financing or General Obligation bonds.
The least polluted, and most risk-free brownfields, will probably attract the
first wave of investors. Badly contaminated properties will be avoided without
large cash infusions from some level of government. Public programs do exist
now for remediations, but they are designed mainly to boost efforts to rescue
economically viable sites. For the worst parcels to be reclaimed, government
agencies must be much more heavily involved financially.
Even so, investors are busily eyeing the more attractive brownfields with
interest, which stems from a confluence of factors, according to Bruce Amos, an
insurance broker with ECS. He credits a good economy, higher land prices,
more flexibility exhibited by regulators, and the current widespread availability of
capital.x When reasonably priced insurance is added to this mix, risks will drop to
tolerable levels.
As for sources of capital, there will always be venture funds willing to
consider, for the right price and compensation, problematic acquisitions that
commercial lenders tend to avoid.x' More traditional sources of capital may flock
to brownfields if investors are able to find an acceptable balance of risk and
reward. A prerequisite for success for the new brownfield investor will be
specialized knowledge, especially of environmental regulations and cleanups.
Joe Carter of RE/National, the company investing AEWs $100 million for
environmentally impaired properties, envisions a group with the right mix of skill
and knowledge being able to access capital through Wall Street firms and turn a
profit. This group will use insurance to convince rating agencies that risks are
acceptably controlled, and so the brownfield can be safely added to a portfolio of
unimpaired assets." Under such favorable conditions, the capital that once
avoided brownfields on principle, should begin to flow freely in.
'Litvan, Laura M., "How Superfund Stifles Growth," Investor's Business Daily, February 13,
1997, p. A1/2.
Ward, Elizabeth, President, Washington Advisors, personal interview, June 17, 1997.
Sterling, Burnett C., "The State of Environmental Reform," Investor's Business Daily, January
16, 1997, p. A2/1.
" Freeman, Paul K. and Howard Kunreuther, "The Roles of Insurance and Well-Specified
Standards in Dealing with Environmental Risks," Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 17,
(1996) pp. 517-530.
V. Dow Jones International News, "Brownfields Market: Prospects Still Good Despite Slow Start,"
9/30/96.
VI. Cantwell, Nancy and Steve Cusano, "Brownfields: Transforming Urban Decay into
Opportunity," Real Estate Perspectives, January, 1997, p. 4.
VII. Salmon, Mike, Director of Exit Strategies, TRC Co., personal interview, June 19, 1997.
VIII. Greenwood and Klink, 1 0 5th Congress, 1s Session, H.R. 873, February 27, 1997, pp. 1-3.
ix. France, Steve, "Experts Say It's Time to Launch Corporate Brownfields Strategies," Real Estate
/ Environmental Liability News, March 7, 1997. pp. 3-4.
x. Amos, Bruce, Insurance agent, ECS, personal interview, June 17, 1997.
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Matrix of State Voluntary Cleanup and Brownfield Programs, by EPA Region
(Northeast-Midwest Institute, September 1996)
Program Participant State Assurances FinancealDescription Liability Provisions Site Eligibility State Oversight Role Requirements Cleanup Standards Provided Assistance
REGION I:
Connecticut Urban Sites State liability is strict, Urban sites with Varies, depending on Full reimbursement New rules establish CNTS issued to new $25 million bondRemedial Action joint and several; CNTS economic whether state or private of DEP oversight numerical standards owners; re-openers fund passed in
Program (1992) issued for new owners of development potential" party cleans the site costs for Type I for direct exposure exist for Type I sites. 1993 (the total has
remediated sites. as defined by state; (Sites classified as sites, lease (residential and risen to $30
may be a Superfund, Type 1, owner; 11, payments made to indus/comm.), million).
RCRA or LUST site. orphan; and il, state for Type 11 contaminated soil
prospective purchaser). (orphan) and Type moblity, and
Ill (prospective volatization from
purchaser) sites, groundwater.
Maine Voluntaiy State liability is strict, All sites except DEP must approve of $500 fee, plus Site specific; 10-5 risk 'Certificate of None; TIFsResponse joint and several; lenders Superfund, RCRA or remedial action plan. reimbursement of level; future land use, completion issued available in someProgram (1993) and development LUST sites, or those slate oversight use of Eli controls for all pollutants locales.
authorities exempt in role operating under state costs. also considered, identified in site
of financier; local permit (e.g., landfills). assessment.
governments may be
held liable in some
cases.
Massachusetts C lean Sites State liability is strict, Sites must be in Both DEP and Cost recovery Cancer rtsk level of CNTS available from None; state mayInitiative (1994) joint and several; lenders Economic Target Area Executive Office of actions available to 1061 for individual Attorney General; consider a loan
and local governments and be redeveloped Business Development the state. pollutants and 10 for may be re-opened if guarantee program
exempt for foreclosed for commercial or involved; oversight aggregate risk, cleanup found in the future.properties if they act to industrial use; PRPs varies depending on Different methods inadequate.
eliminate contaminant not eligible, severity of available for achieving
exposure. contamination, these risk levels.
Licensed Site
Professionals assigned
to sites for technical
review.
New Hampshire Brownfields Liability under the NPL, LUST and landfill Dept. of Environmental Implementation of Statewide cleanup NFA letter, None.Program (1996) Hazardous Waste sites excluded. PRPs, Services approves DES-approved standards (for soil and Certificate ofManagement Act Is municipalities and remedial action plan Remedial Action groundwater) are in Completion, and
strict, lending institutions and final cleanup Plan is required c final stages of covenants-not-to-
may participate. report. development sue are available.
Rhode Island The Industrial Site Liability is strict. joint and NPL, RCRA, LUST, Dept. of Env. Mgmt. Varies according to Four classes of Letter of Compliance None.Remediation and several, and state- permitted approves investigation party's relationship standards exist: Direct given to responsibleReuse Program sites ineligible, plans, remedial action to the site. Failure exposure criteria for parties; CNTS(1995) Responsible parties, plans and final to adhere can indus/comm. and res. granted volunteers,
volunteers, and remediaion report. result in any party facilities; lteachability prospective
prospective becoming a criteria for protection purchasers and
purchasers eligible, responsible party of groundwater (urban lenders.
and subject to resources and
enforcement drinking water).
Matrix of State Voluntary Cleanup and Brownfield Programs, by EPA Region(Northeast-Midwest Institute, September 1996)
Program Participant State Assurances FinancialDescription ability Provison S ligibity State Oversight Role Requirements Cleanup Standards Provided Assistance
Vermont Contaminated Liability protection CERCLA, RCRA and Dept. of Env. $500 application Cleanups standards Certificate of None. State willProperties available only to third VT UST sites Conservation maintains fee; $5,000 deposit are the same as those Completion issued seek budgetRedevelopment parties (e.g., prospective excluded. UST close oversight, from which state required under other by DEC upon authority to provideProgram (1995) purchasers). cleanups constitute including review and oversight costs are state cleanup successful cleanup, two full-timeResponsible party over 80 percent of approval of all site drawn. programs. covering employees to theliability is strict, joint and state cleanup investigation and Groundwater contamination program.
several. activities. cleanup documentation. protection rules are in identified in site work




New Jersey Industrial Sites Memorandum of DEPE low priority" Limited oversight, Reimbursement of 10- for carcinogens NFA letters $55 millionRecovery Act Agreement required; sites, no LUST or unless party requests oversight costs. and Hazard Index of 1 provided, but offer Hazardous(1993); program party allowed to exit the landfill sites; PRPs can more state involvement. for other chemicals; no explicit release Discharge Site
amends the program at any time, participate. State must provide state has soil and from liability; state Grant Program; 5%
Environmental provided site is low public notice and groundwater may re-open case if loans up to $1
Cleanup priority for state. Liability meetings for complex standards, and allows cleanup standards million; $2 million
Responsibility Act for site depends upon cleanups, site-specific cleanups, change, remedy fails grants and loans(1983) enforcement program Eli controls allowed; or new available to localpertaining to the site. historical contamination government for
contamination emerges on site. orphan sites and
considered in cleanup those obtained
levels, through tax sale
.certificates.
New York Voluntary Cleanup Parties withdrawiiig from NPL and RCRA sites State requests that Party must pay Case by case basis; NFA letter releases None.Program (1994) program may face DEC ineligible; slate party enter into DEC oversight land use considered; party from DEC
enforcement action. Superfund and LUST Agreement or Consent costs and meet E/i controls used; enforcement action;Agreements may cover sites may be eligible if Order, DEC signs off terms of state groundwater re-openers maysite investigation only, if applicant is not a PRP on final cleanup. Agreement or cleanup standards in pply.
party suspects extensive lenders, municipalities Consent Order. place.
contamination at the site. and Industrial
Development Authority
are eligible.
Puerto Rico No program at this
time.
Matrix of State Voluntary Cleanup and Brownfield Programs, by EPA Region
(Northeast-Midwest Institute, September 1996)
Program Participant State Assurances Financial
Description Liability Provisions Site Eligibility State Oversight Role Requirements T Cleanup Standards Provided Assistance
REGION iII:
Delaware Voluntary Cleanup State liability is strict, Proximity of site to State maintains Party must enter Two options exist; NFA letters Four primary tools
Program (1993) joint and several; lenders drinking or surface considerable into written either EPA Region available; exist: 1) $250,000
and development waler places involvement throughout agreement with Ill's Risk-Based prospective loan program; 2)
authorities acquiring site constraints on site process; encourages state' state Concentration Tables purchasers may sign Tax credits
through loan default are eligibility; site may not site investigations to recovers costs (10-) or site-specific a Consent Decree covering cleanup
exempt; local be under RCRA or conform to ASTM from party's initial levels (10-1). for contribution available for sites
governments may be LUST; slate has guidelines. DNREC will $5000 deposit. protection; and new with development
Sble for foreclosure discretion to deny only approve of work owners of potential; tax
properties but not for tax participation in the completed by remedialed credits of $500/yr.
delinquency. Both program. consultants that have properties may for cleanup and
lenders and local met the requirements of receive a CNTS. redevelopment
governments may sell the Professional jobs created; 3)
foreclosed property Qualification Program. grant program
without triggering funding 50% of
liability. Their attempts total costs, up to
to clean up the site $25,000; and 4)
without supervision does state revolving loan





Pennsylvania Land Recycling Prospective purchasers NPL, state Superfund Dept. of Env. Cost recovery Three levels of State offers release Industrial Sites
Program (1995) and innocent landowners and LUST sites Resources and Dept. includes fees cleanup standards: from liability for Reuse Program
not liable; nor are ineligible; state- of Commerce oversee imposed on state's background (most approved cleanups provides $17
lenders, economic permitted sites may or program. review of stringent); statewide Re-openers apply million in loans and
development agencies, may riot be eligible. Degree of oversight workplans and final health (presents for various reasons. $5 million in grants.
cities or conservancies if RCRA sites are deperds on cleanup reports. Public range of eanup State funding
they did not cause or eligible. PRPs may standards chosen, involvement may levels); and site- capped at
contribute to the participate. Failure of state to also be a specific (based on $200,000 per site
pollution. Responsible review application requirement, detailed risk assessment and $1
parties must enter forms within 60 days depending on the assessment). million per site
enforceable agreements. results in automatic site. Existing cleanup remediation.
approval for the standards are Loans and grants
applicant. State waives grandfathered in for 3 require 25% match.
permits during remedial years. Infrastructure
work phase. Development
- ,Municipalities may Program has $26
request public million in loans,
involvement plan within withacapof $1.25
30 days of party's million per project.
notice of intent to
remediate. Special
conditions apply to
orphan sites and those
in enterprise zones.
Matrix of State Voluntary Cleanup and Brownfield Programs, by EPA Region
(Northeast-Midwest Institute, September 1996)
Program Participant State Assurances Financial












Alabama State voluntary Liability is proportional. Ineligible sites include ADEM reviews Parties must Site-specific, risk- Upon completion of None.
cleanup program those on (or proposed assessment plans, submit a written based. Remediation activities, ADEM
(administrative for) the NPL, those provides limited request to must achieve a may issue a Notice
procedures). subject to state oversight of field complete a cancer risk reduction of Completion.
enforcement action or activities and may do voluntary cleanup, of between 10(l and
permit (RCRA, some confirmation of which ADEM either 10
hazardous waste). site sampling, accepts or rejects.
Fiorida No program at this
time.
Georgia Hazardous Site Strict, joint, and several. Responsible parties No fee structure is Participants Cleanup standards There will be some None.
Reuse and are ineligible. Sites on currently in place. negotiate a are the same as those form of certification,
Redevelopment the NPL or subject to However, participants corrective action under the 1992 although DNR
Act (1996). enforcement action must reimburse the plan with the DNR. Hazardous Site officials have not
Regulations due to also are not eligible, state any corrective When this is Response Act. determined what
be final in 1997. action costs. complete, they type. Covenants-












Mississippi No program at this
time.
North Carolina No program at this
time.
Matrix of State Voluntary Cleanup and Brownfield Programs, by EPA Region(Northeast-Midwest Institute, September 1996)
Program Participant State Assurances FinancialDescription Liability Provisions -Site Eligibility State Oversight Role Requirements Cleanup Standards Provided Assistance
South Carolina Informal voluntary Officially is strict, joint, Open to both The department Participants Two options exist: 1) DHEC will issue a None.
cleanup program and several. However, responsible parties provides oversight of propose site conduct site-specific completion letter
under State in practice, the scheme and "innocent parties" any site assessment assessment and risk assessments; and when work is
Hazardous Waste is more proportional and Ineligible sites include and remedial activities. remediation 2) establish cleanup finished.
Management Act. causation-based. those subject to OHEC Currently there's no fee activities, and enter goals according to Covenants-not-to-
enforcement or those for THEC services into a contract with EPA Region 3 Risk- sue also may be
under a permit. USTs (although a fee system DHEC. Based Concentration available.
are handled under a should be in place by Tables. Cleanups
separate program. December 19g6). must achieve a 10("5
risk reduction level.
Tennessee Voluntary C'eanup Proportional liability. All inactive hazardous Oversight provided by Party must pay Risk assessments DEP issues a letter None.Oversight and Orphan shares may be substances sites, DEP. $5,000 and cleanups are indicating that
Assistance paid out of the state's Petroleum sites may participation fee to conducted on a site- obligations under theProgram (VOAP). Remedial Action Fund be included, enroll in VOAP. specific basis, consent order have




Illinois Illinois Pre-Notice Proportionate-share; Sites under jurisdiction State establishes $5000 initial fee for State plans to adopt a Parties receive a None.Site Cleanup causation-based of other enforcement project eligibility and oversight costs risk-based "No FurtherProgram (1989) programs are conducts background Party must also methodology called Remediation Letter"ineligible. Certain check. Assessments, allow state access "Tiered Approach to for successful
sites proposed for the investigations, to the site and Cleanup Objectives" cleanups. CNTSNPTL may be eligible if workplans and final enter agreement (TACO) Involves available from thePRP can provide reports are subject to stating compliance three tiers of cleanup Attoey General,
assurances. state approval, with agency standards, and use of although none
cleanup standards E/I controls at Tier Ils issued to date. Re-
and termination sites EPA Soil openers apply in
provisions. Screening Guidelines case of change in
and IL Groundwater land use.
Standards used.
Indiana Voluntary Cleanup Liability is strict, joint and Any contaminated site Quarterly progress $1,000 fee for 3-tiered approach to Certificate of None.Program, in several, is eligible. Low- and reports must be application cleanup standards is Completion issued
operation since medium-priority LUST submitted to IDEM. submittal, including established, by ODEM, following1993. sites may apply. State may waive local site history and depending on future by a CNTS byCERCLA or RCRA and state permits description land use of the site. Governor's Office.
sites may not be during site cleanup. Participants must
eligible. State also provides for sign a Voluntary
public comment period Remediation
following site remedy Agreement with the
selections. State holds state.
applications to the VCP
in confidence.Cneta I
Matrix of State Voluntary Cleanup and Brownfield Programs, by EPA Region
(Northeast-Midwest Institute, September 1996)
Program Participant State Assurances Financial
Deiarilito Proison I. Provided Ai Liabiity Provisions Site Eigibility State Oversight Rote Requirements Cleanup Standards Assistance
Michigan Natural Resources Strict, retroactive liability Any contaminated site MDNR reviews "Aff irmative MDNR to issue CNTS available for State bond issue
Environmental still applies to PRPs, is eligible. Site petitions from parties obligations" now standards for redevelopers of provides up to $40
Protection Act; although new law containing seeking "letter of exist for owners residential, industrial sites. million to
1994 P.A. 451, exempts underground storage determination" or and operators of recreationa, Letter of municipalities to
Part 201. owners/operators from tanks are usually CNTS. both of which sites suspected or commercial and determination fund site cleanup,
Amended in 1gg5, liability at current sites if remediated under the provide relief from known to be industrial uses. E/i provided to anyone as well as $10
they did not cause the requirements of Part liability. MDNR has contaminated to controls, deed purchasing property. million for site
release. New law also 213 of the law enforcement authority remediate and restrictions and other Letter protects investigation A
expands liability to affect the return of restore the site. measures allowed purchaser from new revolving loan
exemptions for local warehoused" Fines and penalties State has lowered liability pending fund exists for
governments, properties to productive apply for failure to acceptable risks for approved baseline municipalities. Tax
use. comply. carcinogens from 10-6 assessment of the credits also are
to is-. site. available.
Minnesota Voluntary Strict, joint and several Any site not under the State maintains close Program requires Background or site- Depending on Two new
Investigation and liability provisions of the jurisdiction other state involvement throughout entry into formal specific levels may be whether the programs:
Cleanup Program state Superfund program rernediation programs: whole process, Earty agreement with chosen. Eli controls participant is a Contamination
(1988) apply. LUST, RCRA, landfills; site investigations state. Oversight may be used. responsible party or Cleanup Grants
or sites involving which reveal limited costs are not, a nunber of Program makes
removal of asbestos, contamination exit the ecoveied on a assurances are $7.8 million
radon, radioactive program. quarteily basis. used, including: No available in
waste or agricultural Action Letters, matching grants for
chemicals. Low- Partial No Action sites with
priority state Lettes, No development
Superfund programs Association potential; and
may be admitted. just Determinations, Off- authorization for
as high-risk VIC sites Site Source Metropolitan
may be transferred to Determination Council to raise up
the state Superfund Letters or to $6.6 ofillwo
program. Agreements and annually for
Certificates of cleanup grants
Completion. (money restricted
oto 7-county region).
Ohio Real Estate Liability for PRPs in the Sites are ineligible if Slate oversight role has Participants Rules (final in Oct. 96) State issues CNTS Low-interest loans
Cleanup and progranm is strict, joint they are facing been privatized through responsible for call for three sets of upon approval of available from
Reuse Program and proportional, enforcement action use of Licensed Site oversight costs on generic cleanup NFA letter state. There are
(1995). interim Lenders acting in a under CERCLA, Professionals. a fee-for-service standards with a 10(-5 developed by the also tax
program in effect fiduciary role only are RCRA; LUST, TSCA; State does conduct basis. Public risk reduction factor Licensed Site abatements for
until regulations exempt from liability, or SDWA. Landfills audits of 25% of sites information notices (res, comm, ind). Professional. Re- property owners
are promulgated Local governments may facing closure and and is involved in also the Site-specific cleanups openers may apply. where an increase
(due 9/95). or may not receive other sites under requests for variances responsibility of the can be conducted. in property value
liability protection, enforcement by the and other site-specific participant. Also included are soil has occurred due
state are ineligible, situationsa standards when to remediation.
mobility to ground
watr is a facor.
Matrix of State Voluntary Cleanup and Brownfield Programs, by EPA Region
(Northeast-Midwest Institute, September 1996)
Program I Participant State Assurances FinancialIF - I Description Liability Provisions Ste Eligibility State Oversght Roe Requirements Cleanup Standards Provided Assistance
Wisconsin Land Recycling Prospective purchasers Contact WI DNR for State oversight Currently no fees Full site cieanups are Release from liab~ility No financing
Act (1994) and innocent landowners information on site required from initial are required, required to protect offered under the specific to
may participate; eligibility application through however, groundwater to risk state's Hazardous brownfields;
responsible parties are proposed remedial recommendations levels of 10- for Substance however.
pursued for cleanup work plan and "close to impose a $250 carcinogens. Soil Discharge Law petroleum and
costs in the event out" of participant's file application fee and cleanup standards Release is chemicai cleanups
voluntary agreements fall signaling cleanup's between $1000 established through transferrable to may be eligible for
through. Municipalities completion, and $3,000 deposit numerical, future owners. other sources of
are exempt from liability (depending on size groundwater impact funding.
foproperties acquired of site) are equation or site-
through foreclosure or expected to be specific modeing.
tax delinquency under passed by the
certain circumstances. legislature this




Arkansas Voluntary Cleanup Purchaser is not liable Limited to prospective ADPC&E comments on Purchaser Determined on a Once the approved None.
Program (1995). for prior contamination, purchasers of purchaser's site conducts site case-by-case basis. remedy has been
but will be responsible if abandoned industrial assessment but does assessment implemented, the
future contamination is property. not actually oversee activities; then department may
discovered at the site, site assessment purchaser and issue a covenant-
activities. The ADPC&E enter into not-to-sue.
department approves a consent
the proposed remedy; administration
charges $65/hr. fee for order (public notice
dept. oversight, required) which
specifies any
remedial activities.
Louisiana Voluntary Cleanup LDEQ Is in the
Program (July process of adopting
1996). minimum remediation
Program under standards. Until they
deveiopment. are complete, no sites
can proceed through
the program.
New Mexico No program at this
time.
Okiahoma No program at this
time.
Matrix of State Voluntary Cleanup and Brownfield Programs, by EPA Region
(Northeast-Midwest Institute, September 1996)
Program Participant State Assurances Financial
Description _ Liability Provisions Site Eligibility State Oversight Role Requirements Cleanup Standards Provided Assistance
Texas Texas Voluntary State liability is strict, Any site not under a State oversight varies, Initial $1000 Use of risk-based Certificate of None.
Cleanup Program joint and several. state or federal depending on cleanup application fee, cleanup standards Completion available(1995) enforcement action or standards chosen. plus called the "Risk only to prospective
operating under a Site-specific cleanups reimbursements for Reduction Rules." purchasers and
state permit. entail close oversight state oversight. No Three options exist: future lenders for
by the state. public notification 1) cleanup to successfully
required. Must background levels; 2) reniediated sites.
enter into a use generic health- No release from
Voluntary Cleanup based standards that liability for current
Agreement with the achieve 1016); 3) owner of the
state. Conduct site-specific property. Reopeners
risk assessment, available to the
possibly use Eli state.
controls, and attain
between 1 0 4) and
10(-6) risk range.
REGION VII:
Iowa No program at thistime.
Kansas No program at this
D time.
Missouri Voluntary Cleanup Unsatisfactory cleanups Any site except those State maintains a Letter of "How Clean is Clean" "Clean letter" is For brownfields
Program (1994) can lead to enforcement under state or federal monitoring role agreement with guidance document issued by state; purchased from the
under state superfund enforcement action, throughout the process; state; $200 calls for two tiers of does not release city or county,
and RCRA programs. operating under state quarterly progress application fee plus cleanup: 1) Generic party from liability. parties may get
license or proposed for reports may be required an up-front deposit cleanup standards; Re-openers apply. financial
the NPL PRPs may in some cases. No of between $500 and 2) Alternative or assistance from
participate in program. public participation and $5000 to pay site-specific, risk- state (i.e., loans,
requirements. oversight costs. based cleanup loan guarantees,
standards. t grants, or tax
credits).
Nebraska Remedial Action Strict, joint, and several. Open to anyone. State oversight of site Participants submit Determined on a site- Upon completion of None.
Plan Monitoring assessment and a remedial action specific basis. State the remedial action
Prograin (RAPMA) remedial action plan is plan on an NDEQ groundwater plan, NDEQ will
provided. form. Applicants standards must be issue a letter stating
muSt create a met. that "No Further






Matrix of State Voluntary Cleanup and Brownfield Programs, by EPA Region
(Northeast-Midwest Institute, September 1996)
Program Participant State Assurances Financial
LiabilitDescription  iProvisions Site Eligibility State Oversight Role Requirements Cleanup Standards Provided Assistance
REION YIll:
Colorado Voluntary Cleanup Federal CERCLA liability Program geared Limited. State $2,000 fee Parties may use soil The applicant self- NoneProgram (1994). applies. Colorado and toward site owners oversight ends once the imposed for slate standards from other certifies that the
EPA signed a SMOA rather than prospective stale has reviewed and review of states or EPA Soil cleanup is complete.
indicating that EPA will purchasers approved application, application (the Screening Guidelines. However, under the
not pursue sites that No construction unspent portion is Groundwater cleanup state/EPA SMOA, to
have successfully oversight. No public refunded). required to MCLs. E/i obtain EPA "sign-
completed Colorado's participation controls allowed; off," parties must
program (and received a requirements. future land use may submit a completion
"No Further determine cleanup report as a new
Determination" letter). standards. application for a "No
Furth a
Determination" along
with a new filing fee.
Montana Voluntary Cleanup Strtct, joint, and several. Any entity may apply DEQ provides Parties submit a Applicable water No Further Action None.
and Alternatives to this except NPL sites, sites oversight Public VCRA application quality standards letters may be
Redevelopment scheme are under subject to enforcement comment pertod and proposed work must be met. Soil issued upon
Act (VCRA) consideration, action by state, and required. plan to DEQ. The cleanup standards are successful
Program. sLUSTs. plan must be dertved via risk completion of VCRA
implemented within assessment on a site- plan and
24 months specific basis. reimbursement of







North Dakota No program at this
time.
South Dakota Developing Strtct, joint, and several. Any responsible party, Direct oversight of No details Site-specific risk No liability relief None.
program within Current property owners group, or entity, assessment, corrective available, assessments available for
existing state law, are deemed "responsible action, and compliance Cleanup standards prospective
parties." monitoring are the same for purchasers,
brownfietds as for although some form
other sites having a of federal liability
regulated substance relief may be
release. South available if the state






Matrix of State Voluntary Cleanup and Brownfield Programs, by EPA Region
(Northeast-Midwest Institute, September 1996)
Program Participant State Assurances Financial
Description Liabiity Provisions Ste E gib ty State Oversight Role Requirements Cleanup Standards Provided Assistance
Wyoming No program at this
time.
REGION IX:
Arizona State voluntary Liability is strict and Anyone is eligible, DEQ provides varying Participants must State uses interim soil Prospective None.
cleanup program several. except sites subject to levels of oversight, submit a remedial remediation standards Purchaser
takes place under enforcement action, depending on action plan. until final rules are Agreements and
the Water Quality complexity of project. published in August Covenants-not-to-
Revolving Fund. DEQ attempts to 1997. Two sets of Sue are available.
recoup costs when tables exist






reflect a 10emd cancer
excess risk.
California Voluntary Cleanup State liability is strict, Eligibility is denied to Participants work Participants must State Superfund No Further Action Nothing for regular
Program (1993). joint and several; a pilot sites in state or federal closely with DTSC in provide an program cleanup letters granted VCP; small grants
program allows use of Superfund program designing assessment advance payment standards apply. following site are to be made
proportional liability and sites involving and cleanup plans. to DTSC for half investigation which available for up to
settlements. UST removal, the project's shows no need for 10 sites in the state
estimated cost, remediation. pilot program.




Guam No program at this
time.
Hawaii No program at this
lime.




No program at this
lime.
Matrix of State Voluntary Cleanup and Brownfield Programs, by EPA Region
(Northeast-Midwest Institute, September 1996)
Program P I Participant 1 I State Assurances Financial
Descriptioni State Oversight Role Requirements Cleanup Standards Provided Assistance
Idaho Voluntary Cleanup Liability relief provided Sites containing Oversight funded by At the outset, DEQ Regulations due by Certificates of Real estate tax
Program (1996) for "innocent parties." hazardous substances participant, and participant Spring of 1997. In Completion and abatements are
becomes effective and petroleum. Other commensurate with negotiate a their current form, the covenants-not-to- available. Upon
in 1997 with sites (including RCRA activities at the site. Voluntary rules contain two sue are available receiving a
promulgation of facilities) may be Remediation Work options: 1) generic covenant-not-to-
regulations. included in program at plan that specifies cleanup standards; sue, the party may
DEQ discretion. state oversight and 2) risk-based site- apply to the taxing
parameters. specific cleanup entity for a 50% tax
Applicant provides standards break on the
a deposit for future property's
state oversight appreciation due to
costs. remedial activities.
Oregon Voluntary Cleanup State liability is strict, Sites must be low- to State maintains heavy Once site is Background cleanup No Further Action Nothing.
Program (1991) joint and several, medium-priority and oversight role, accepted into the levets are letters issued for
Parties may be liable it must not be in NPL or conducting file program, a Letter recommended. successful cleanups;
their sites are referred to RCRA program. searches, approving of of Agreement is Where this is not NFA letter releases
state's Superfund LUST sites may be site assessments, signed between the possible, risk party from state
program during the eligible, remedial workplans and party and DEQ. [eduction levels of 10 liability. Re-openers
course of the cleanup final cleanup reports. $5,000 fee due at
process. Withdrawal Complexity of site this time. Public aipe foaotnppy
from binding agreement cleanup also a factor. comment period of csimple" ands.Fo
with state may result in 30 days required; tcmex sites. orl
enforcement action, hearings must be the alteE
held if 10 or more untarrtedy
peope s desre. feasibility study
stating their need.
Washington Voluntary Cleanup State liability is strict, Few restrictions apply; Oversight varies, Simple sites Cleanups must No Further Action No official funding
Program. joint and several, state may clean LUST, depending upon degree require participants reduce risk to level of letter issued for source. State
Lenders are exempt RCRA and NPL sites of complexity at the only to reimburse 10 for cancer- certain sites; CNTS Dept. of Ecology
under certain under its program. site, state for oversight causing substances. issued as well, may use existing
circumstances. Locat costs. More E I controls allowed especially for sites funds, based on
govemnments receive no complex cleanups for commercial and involving heavy state applicant's need.
exemptions. . entail entry into industrial properties, oversight function.
binding agreement, supported by
withdrawal from feasibility study
which may result in stating their need.
enforcement Future land use may
action, be used for
determining remedies,
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